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I. INTRODUCTION
It remains a long-held principle of federal-state relations that
federal courts are supreme over the states in interpreting federal law.
Over 180 years ago in Martin v. Hunter'sLessee, Justice Story decried
the suggestion that state court decisions concerning federal law could
evade federal review, emphasizing that, "It]he public mischiefs that
would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable."' In
the spirit of this dictum, federal courts have routinely rejected the
suggestion that they should defer to state agency interpretations of
federal law.? Such deference, the argument goes, would destroy the
3
uniform interpretation and application of federal law.
In this Article, I challenge this conventional view. The classic
dictum in Marbury v. Madison calls for federal courts to have the
final say on "what the law is,"4 yet they already defer to federal agencies under the Chevron doctrine. 5 In our contemporary age of coopera-

1.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
2.
See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
3.
See, e.g., AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 795-96
(10th Cir. 1989) ("The state agency's determination of procedural and substantive compliance
with federal law is not entitled to the deference afforded to a federal agency."); Turner v.
Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (emphasizing "the need for coherent and
uniform construction of federal law nationwide").
4.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
5.
See Chevron U.S-A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (stating that "if the statute is silent or ambiguous ... the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction ofthe statute").
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five federalism statutory schemes,6 the basic principles that animate
the Chevron doctrine similarly call for deference by federal courts to
state agencies. Moreover, such deference serves an important goal of
cooperative federalism: it allows for and encourages state experimentation and interstate competition. In short, Chevron calls for an exception not only to the Marbury dictum, but to the Hunter's Lessee
dictum as well.
To illustrate my argument, I examine the implementation of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the Act" or "the Telecom Act"), 7
a recently enacted federal regulatory program that relies heavily on
state agencies by inviting them to superintend-under federal
statutory standards and subject to federal court review-the
development of "interconnection agreements" between incumbent
monopolists and new entrants into the local telephone market.8 This
examination demonstrates that the federal courts are not well served
by an intrusive standard of review of state agency decisions, and that,
if not instructed to defer to state agency decisions in principle, they
will nonetheless endeavor to do so in practice. To be sure, my
argument anticipates that federal laws such as the Telecom Act will
not be applied uniformly across all fifty states. But complete
uniformity in the implementation of cooperative federalism statutes is
6.
By "cooperative federalism," I mean federal programs that charge state agencies-as
well as federal ones-with the responsibility of interpreting and implementing federal law. The
Supreme Court sanctioned such programs in FERC v. Mississippi,456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982). As
one commentator put it, "Congress is not limited to a choice between allocating all power to
regulate an area of conduct to state or federal agencies. It can combine federal and state
regulatory power through any form of cooperative or creative federalism it finds appropriate to a
particular field of regulation." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation,Federalism and
Administrative Law: Agency Power to PreemptState Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 643
(1985); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (applying the term
"cooperative federalism" to a statutory scheme that provides for state regulation, with federal
bureaucratic backup, to implement federal objectives).
7.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
8.
A number of other federal statutes, such as the Medicaid Act and a number of environmental laws-including the Clear Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act-similarly rely on state agencies. See Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j
(1994); Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994). In the environmental area, states are allowed to assume responsibility for administering and enforcing an
environmental program once the EPA determines that the state's program meets minimum
federal standards. By setting a federal floor with room for state experimentation, these laws:
(1) call for state implementation; (2) set clear minimum standards; (3) respect state autonomy;
and (4) provide mechanisms to police the process. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of
Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 1198 (1995); Robert V. Percival,
EnvironmentalFederalism: HistoricalRoots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141,
1174-75 (1995).
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both an undesirable and unattainable goal, as the costs of intrusive
judicial review are considerable, and there are important benefits that
come from experimentation and interstate competition. 9 Accordingly,
if federal courts overseeing state agency decisions employ an intrusive
standard of review, they will undermine both the sensible
presumption set out in Chevron about how to allocate responsibility
between agencies and courts as well as the goals of cooperative
federalism regulatory programs. 10
Part II of this Article outlines the long-standing admonition in
favor of federal judicial supremacy, the counter-admonition in favor of
federal agencies set out in Chevron, and the approach that courts
have taken on whether this counter-admonition applies to state agencies-i.e., whether they deserve deference in interpreting federal law.
Part III focuses on how this issue is raised by the Telecom Act, explaining the background to the Act and its basic structure. Part IV
explains why the reasons for deference given in Chevron-delegation,
institutional competence, and gap filling-counsel in favor of according deference to state agencies charged with interpreting federal law.
Moreover, Part IV explains that judicial deference to state agencies is
also justified by the important role for state experimentation and
interstate competition within cooperative federalism statutory
schemes. And to underscore the failings of intrusive federal court
review of state agency action, Part IV reviews the history of the
Supreme Court's ratemaking decisions of the early part of this
century, highlighting how it provides strong evidence that an
intrusive standard of judicial review of state agency decisions
implementing the Telecom Act (or similar statutory schemes) is
unlikely to be successful. Finally, Part V addresses the issue of
uniformity, arguing both that diversity within federal law is a
familiar practice that has distinct advantages and that, in any event,
federal courts are unlikely to succeed in ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of cooperative federalism statutes like the
Telecom Act even if they attempt to do so.
9.

Unfortunately, commentators have tended not to appreciate this point. See Peter

Schuck, Some Reflections on the Federalism Debate, 14 YALE L. & POLY REV. 1, 4 (1996)

("Federalism now serves both as an instrument of the modern administrative state and as a
rather flexible institutional accommodation to the extraordinary diversity of American society
and to the challenges that this diversity poses for national unity. This diversity-accommodating
aspect of federalism receives too little attention from commentators.").
10. The stakes involved in whether Chevron applies to judicial review of state agency deci-

sions would, of course, be lower if Chevron failed to deter judges from interpreting ambiguous
statutes. A recent study, however, suggests that Chevron has had its intended effect. See Orin
S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S.
CourtsofAppeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 59-60 (1998).
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II. FEDERAL SUPREMACY, CHEVRON, AND SKEPTICISM TOWARD
STATE AGENCIES

Throughout the history of "Our Federalism,"" states have been
assigned an uneasy role to play with respect to the interpretation of
federal law. Although state courts are charged (and entrusted) with
hearing most types of federal claims,12 the Supreme Court has underscored the importance of federal court review of those decisions to
ensure that federal law is interpreted correctly and consistently
across the land. 1 As we approach a new century, the tension between
the principle of federal judicial supremacy and the important (and
often unreviewed) role played by the states in interpreting federal law
is becoming increasingly apparent. For example: the Supreme
Court's limited docket means that it cannot effectively oversee the
large number of state decisions involving matters of federal law; 4
Congress has specifically called for a deferential review of state court
decisions on federal law in the context of habeas corpus review; 15 and
cooperative federalism statutes have increasingly required state
agencies to interpret federal law in the first instance. Nonetheless,
the rhetoric championing federal judicial supremacy and uniformity
in the interpretation and application of federal law continues to
obscure the increasingly important role played by the states in
developing federal law. Before examining the relationship between
Chevron and judicial review of state agency decisions, this Part first
11. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 4445 (1971) ("It should never be forgotten that this
slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a
highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.").
12. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1947) (asserting that state policy against
enforcing federal "penal" statutes was not a "valid excuse" for refusing to adjudicate a case
involving such a statute).
13. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816) (stating that
without supervision, federal law would be interpreted differently in each state).
14. As Justice Brennan has explained, the large number of state court decisions on
matters of federal law means that the Supreme Court "cannot even come close to 'doing the
whole job'" of ensuring the uniform and correct application of federal law by state courts.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). Paul Bator put this issue in more numeric terms:
We have a pool of some 55,000 appellate cases involving issues of federal law that have
been decided on a regional basis. No effective system exists to harmonize and stabilize
this enormous body of cases except recourse to the discretionary jurisdiction of one
Supreme Court of nine judges sitting always en banc. Thus, the pool of 55,000 cases
generates over 4,000 requests for review by the Supreme Court. Out of this number, the
Supreme Court selects for review and decides the 150 to 175 cases that have a uniform
and nationwide authority.
Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong With the Supreme Court?, 51 U. Prrr. L. Rgv. 673,679 (1990).
15. See 28 U.S.CA § 2254(dXl) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (stating that habeas relief is
available only where a state court "unreasonab[ly] applied]" clearly established law).
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reviews the traditional justification for federal judicial supremacy
over state interpretive authority.
A. FederalSupremacy and State InterpretiveAuthority
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,16 Justice Story offered the pathmarking tribute to federal supremacy. In that case, a Virginia state
court had refused to follow a ruling issued by the Supreme Court on a
matter involving federal law, concluding that it was not subject to
federal court review.' 7 In making clear that the Constitution grants
the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review state court interpretations of federal law, Justice Story stressed the importance of
the uniform interpretation and application of federal law.
Specifically, he explained that:
Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might differently interpret a statute, or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itselt If there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant
judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and
the constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and
might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or
efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend such a state
of things would be truly deplorable ....
18

The principle that federal courts must superintend state court
interpretations of federal law often goes hand in hand with the admonition that federal courts must always exercise the full extent of
the jurisdiction conferred upon them. Put simply, if federal courts
could yield jurisdiction to state courts in certain cases, there would be
nothing sacrosanct about the need to oversee all state court rulings on
matters of federal law. That is, admitting that there are exceptions to
the admonition that federal courts must exercise the full extent of
their jurisdiction suggests that there may be exceptions to the necessity of reviewing all state court interpretations of federal law. Of late,
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there are exceptions to the
rule that federal courts must exercise the full extent of their jurisdiction, but has made plain that such exceptions are rare, remarking
that "federal courts have 'a virtually unflagging obligation.., to
exercise the jurisdiction given them.' ,,9 At the dawn of the republic,
16. Hunter'sLessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 304.
17. See id. at 305.
18. Id. at 348.

19. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (quoting
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
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Chief Justice Marshall put the point even more strongly in Cohens v.
Virginia: "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the constitution.20 Not coincidentally,
this warning from Chief Justice Marshall came in defense of the
Supreme Court's authority to review state court decisions.
Despite Hunter's Lessee's rhetoric urging federal judicial supremacy, the reality of federal judicial practice has been much more
restrained. In fact,
[i]n the early days of our Republic, Congress was content to leave the task of
interpreting and applying federal laws in the first instance to the state courts;
with one short-lived exception, Congress did not grant the inferior federal
courts original jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law until 1875.21

This is not to say that the Hunter's Lessee dictum is without force, but
rather that it overstates the role of the Supreme Court in the federal
system. Thus, notwithstanding the strong rhetoric of Hunter's Lessee
and Cohens, Chief Justice Marshall did appreciate that the argument
for (or against) federal jurisdiction was not an absolute command, but
22
rather could be accommodated to different circumstances.
Unfortunately, even in the face of the Supreme Court's recognition
that different circumstances justify the yielding of federal jurisdiction
23
and that absolute uniformity in federal law is more fiction than fact,
the lower courts' attitude toward state agencies has far more often
reflected the rhetorical concerns about a lack of uniformity than the
reality that federal courts are not the supreme unifying force
suggested by Hunter'sLessee.
B. Chevron
Notwithstanding Marbury's vision of judicial supremacy,
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
instructed federal courts to abstain from second-guessing a federal
agency's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms

20. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
21. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
22. See Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240, 264 (1804) (concluding that a case

"entirely between foreigners" should be heard based upon "considerations drawn from public
convenience" and the fact that the parties did not object).
23.

See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 827 (Brennan, J., dissenting) C'Concededly, because

federal jurisdiction is not always exclusive and because federal courts may disagree with one
another, absolute uniformity has not been obtained....').
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where the statutory scheme assigned the implementation of its
provisions to an expert agency.24 Indeed, Chevron's holding is one of
the cornerstone principles of modern administrative law. Because it
admonishes courts to respect agency interpretations despite
Marbury's call for judicial supremacy, "Chevron is widely regarded as
a kind of 'counter-Marbury'for the administrative state."2 5 For the

many courts who previously refused to accord respect to the
interpretations of ambiguous statutes rendered by administrative
agencies, this admonition called for a fundamental paradigm shift.26

In Chevron, the Supreme Court set out a two step analysis for
courts to employ in reviewing agency decisions. First, they must ask
whether the statute speaks directly to the issue at hand, using "the
'traditional tools of statutory construction' to determine whether
Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue."27

Where

Congress' intention is evident from such a search, deference is not
appropriate. 2s If the statute is ambiguous or does not express
Congress' intention on the matter, the court must ask whether the
interpretation adopted by the agency is reasonable, not whether the
interpretation is the one that the court would have selected were it to
make the determination in the first instance. 29 Put simply, under the
first step, a court must consider whether the statutory text, history,
and purpose require a certain interpretation; under the second step, a

24.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843

(1984).

25. Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 969
(1992). Professor Sunstein similarly described the effect of Chevron as a "kindof Marbury, or
counter-Marbury,for the administrative state." Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990).
26. For an example of how courts viewed administrative agencies in the pre-Chevron era,
see Allegheny General Hospitalv. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) C'ITjhe Board is not a
court nor is it equal to this court in matters of statutory interpretation.").
27. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1125 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). The traditional tools include examination of the
statute's text, legislative history, and structure, see Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 116 F.3d
507, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1997), as well as its purpose, see First Nael Bank & Trust v. National Credit
Union, 90 F.3d 525, 529-30 (D.C. Cir. 1996). One commentator has explained that this inquiry
seeks to determine whether Congress meant "to express something, but did it ambiguously, or
[was] ambiguous because it meant to express nothing." Michael Herz, Deference Running RiotSeparatingInterpretationand Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 207 (1992).
28. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 894 F.2d 438, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
29. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 285
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that agency interpretation must be "reasonable and consistent with the
statutory purpose"); City of Cleveland v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 68 F.3d
1361, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that agency interpretation must be "reasonable and
consistent with the statutory scheme and legislative history").
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court must consider whether these factors permit the interpretation
30
chosen by the agency.
After setting out this two step analysis, the Chevron Court
stressed the two basic rationales for its approach. First, it emphasized that delegation to an agency can be implicit as well as explicit,
and that "[i]n such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of an agency. ' 1 Second, the Court stressed that
the expert agency merits deference because an agency charged with
implementing a statute has a superior understanding of the
"statutory policy in the given situation [and] has depended upon more
than ordinary knowledge" in reaching its conclusion. 2 In addition to
these two reasons, Chevron's progeny have highlighted two other
justifications for deferring to federal agencies:
their ability to
generate a uniform construction of federal law,33 and their
s
responsiveness to Congress. 4

Because the Chevron principle is sufficiently flexible to be
interpreted differently by courts and commentators, it is important
that I define what I mean by Chevron deference. In essence, I view
Chevron as admonishing courts to superintend regulatory schemes by
ensuring that articulable legal principles-the definition of a statutory concept through the traditional tools of statutory interpretation
or the delineation of the bounds of agency discretion-are judicially
30.

See Bell AtL Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

31. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also id. at 842-43 (stating that if congressional silence
"left a gap for the agency to fill," courts must defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it is
a "permissible construction of the statute"); Schwartz v. Gordbn, 761 F.2d 864, 868 (2d Cir.
1985) (holding that agency vested with policy-making power is authorized to fill in gaps that
may have been left by Congress in a statute, so long as the agency's interpretation is
"reasonably defensible"); Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof
Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 516 (stating that when Congress leaves ambiguity in a statute it
confers discretion on the appropriate agency to clarify the ambiguity, and the only question for
the court is whether the agency did so in a constitutional manner).
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)
(acknowledging judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statute); Friends of
Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 449 (2d Cir. 1985) (affording considerable deference
to any reasonable interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with administering it,
"especially where specialized agency understanding is involved").
33. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495-96 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
Belshe v. Orthopaedic Hosp., 118 S. Ct. 684 (1998); AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir. 1989); Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir.
1989) (per curiam).
34. See Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Federal agencies are also entitled to deference because their activities are subject to continuous congressional supervision by virtue of Congress' powers of advice and consent, appropriation, and
oversight. Such direct and continuous congressional supervision is absent when state authori.
ties are doing the regulating.").

10
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enforced, whereas intricate technical and policy judgments are left to
agencies. 35 At the macro level, this principle of deference calls for
agencies to defer to reasonable interpretations of statutory gaps or
ambiguities; but on a more micro level, this principle also counsels
respect for agencies in reviewing the exercise of their discretion in the
implementation of certain tasks assigned to them. To be sure, defining the range of reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statutory
term may sometimes resemble the determination of exactly how a
statute limits an agency's discretion, but the two tasks are
analytically distinct and separable in theory, even if not in practice.s'
C. Hostility Toward State Agency Interpretationof FederalLaw
Although the Supreme Court has regularly revisited the application of the Chevron doctrine, it has yet to address the role of state

35. Some courts have distinguished between the level of deference called for by
Chevron-where the agency enjoys a statutory mandate to address a legal question-and that
called for by Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)-where the agency's authority
stems from its familiarity with an area. Compare First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Commissioner,
135 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 1998) (leaving open whether interpretive rules issued after notice
and comment deserve Chevron deference), Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44
F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (stating that interpretive rules deserve some deference,
but not the "substantial deference" called for by Chevron), affd Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 516 U.S. 152 (1996), and Griffon v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 802 F.2d 146, 148 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (leaving
unresolved whether Chevron applies to interpretive rules), with Health Ins. Ass'n of America v.
Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 424 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that interpretive rules merit Chevron
deference).
For simplicity purposes, this Article refers to Chevron as reflecting the principle that
agencies authorized to implement statutes merit deference. That is, this Article does not
address whether there are different levels of deference, and if so, what type of deference state
agencies merit in implementing cooperative federalism statutes like the Telecom Act. See Ritter
v. Cecil County Office of Hous. and Community Dev., 33 F.3d 323, 328 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting
that state agency implementation of federal law deserves Skidmore deference when approved by
a federal agency). Indeed, it may well make little or no practical difference whether an agency
enjoys Chevron or Skidmore deference. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations
Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 (1990) (arguing that reviewing
courts often defer to informal agency interpretations that are not technically covered by the
Chevron doctrine).
36. A court might employ this distinction, for example, by imposing certain constraints
based upon its definition of an ambiguous statutory term, such as the "cost"-based pricing
standard for network elements set out in the Telecom Act, see infra notes 173-75 and
accompanying text, but leave it to state agencies to implement the courts interpretation of that
term. In practice, however, I suspect that a de novo review of an agency's interpretation of a
statute's ambiguities or gaps would not necessarily be separable from an intrusive oversight
over the implementation of that interpretation. That is, courts may need to police the exercise
of agency discretion with considerable care if they wish to enforce the statutory constraints over
which they claim sole interpretive authority. Some courts have attempted to make this
distinction, but, as discussed infra Part V.B.2, it is questionable whether their decisions will
ensure that their vision of the statute is actually implemented.
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agencies charged with implementing federal law-i.e., whether the
Hunter's Lessee dictum, as well as the Marbury dictum, should yield
to the realities of the modern administrative state. Increasingly,
courts are being forced to confront this issue, as Congress has enacted
a number of statutes that invite state agencies to implement federal
regulatory schemes. To determine whether state agencies merit
deference in implementing such schemes, the federal courts must
reconcile their traditional bias against leaving federal law in the
hands of the states with the fundamental underpinnings of the
Chevron doctrine and the purpose of cooperative federalism
regulatory schemes.
The federal courts of appeals that have thus far considered
whether the Chevron doctrine applies to cooperative federalism
schemes have declined to examine critically the Hunter's Lessee dictum. Instead, they have reconciled this dictum with Chevron by concluding that Chevron cannot demand deference to state agencies implementing federal law because a central purpose of the Chevron
doctrine is to ensure the uniform application of federal law. After all,
it is well settled'that "federal statutes are generally intended to have
37
uniform nationwide application."
A 1989 Second Circuit case, Turner v. Perales, exemplifies the
analysis followed by many federal courts.38 In Turner, the Second
Circuit explained that there are two types of regulatory schemes-(1)
"'cooperative federalism [schemes],' in which state agencies are given
broad responsibility and latitude in administering [federal] programs;" and (2) purely federal schemes that "envision unitary or uniform application from state to state"-with Chevron deference applicable to federal agencies in the latter, but not to state agencies in the
former.3 9 To justify this holding, Turner explained that because state
agency decisions implementing federal law cannot contribute to the
"coherent and uniform construction of federal law nationwide," they
do not deserve deference in federal court.40 Relying on Turner, both
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits subsequently refused to defer to state
agencies in the Medicaid context, even though in these cases a federal
41
agency had guided and approved the decision of the state agency.
37. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989).
38. Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that a New
York State Department of Social Services interpretation of federal housing law did not deserve
deference).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.2d 1491, 1495-96 (9th Cir. 1997) (reviewing
state Medicare agency decision de novo because state agencies are not due the same deference
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Unfortunately, these three cases-Turner and its Ninth and Tenth
Circuit counterparts-dealt with the deference issue in summary
fashion and declined to entertain the possibility that a federal statutory provision could be interpreted differently by different state agencies and still merit deference-even if the interpretation fell within a
reasonable range cabined by either a federal agency's supervision or
the statutory term itself.
The Second Circuit later reconsidered its Turner opinion in the
Medicaid context in Perry v. Dowling, holding that where a decision of
a state agency is approved by its federal counterpart, that decision is
entitled to Chevron deference. 42 In Perry, the Second Circuit reasoned
that the Medicaid Act's unique regulatory scheme-under which the
federal Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") sets forth
guidelines for the states to follow and approves their decisions implementing federal law-justified giving Chevron deference to the state
agency decisions.4 Although their treatment of the issue has not spe-'
cifically referenced Chevron, the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits all
appear to concur with the approach taken in Perry.44 The Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have shown even greater respect for the decisions of
state agencies than the other circuits, but their holdings that state
agency decisions may be given deference have also emphasized the
role of the federal agency in the statutory scheme. 45 In essence, although no court has squarely held that Chevron applies to state agencies implementing cooperative federalism statutes, a number of courts
as federal agencies), cert. denied, Belshe v. Orthopaedic Hosp., 118 S. Ct. 684 (1998); AMISUB
(PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir. 1989) (same).
42. Perry v. Dowling, 95 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In these circumstances, in which
the state has received prior federal-agency approval to implement its plan, the federal agency
expressly concurs in the state's interpretation of the statute, and the interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute, that interpretation warrants deference."); see also DeSario v.
Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 96 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that where a federal agency approves a state
agency's plan, that plan deserves judicial deference).
43. Perry,95 F.3d at 237.
44. See Abbeville Gen. Hosp. v. Ramsey, 3 F.3d 797, 804 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that "a
presumption of regularity and deferential standard attaches to [a state agency] exercise of
discretion" under the Medicaid Act where there has been federal agency guidance and review of
the state agency); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 983 F.2d 1460, 1462-63 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that because of federal agency approval, a federal court "must review [a state] plan with
the deference accorded federal agency actions"); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885
F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that the Medicaid Act "contemplates a deferential standard of
review by the courts in assessing compliance with the 'reasonable and adequate'" reimbursement standard).
45. See Clark v. Alexander, 85 F.3d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 1996) (setting forth a two-step
process of first assessing whether a state agency acted in a manner consistent with the federal
scheme, and then upholding the state action if not arbitrary or capricious); Ritter v. Cecil
County Office of Hous. and Community Dev., 33 F.3d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); Day v.
Shalala, 23 F.3d 1052, 1060 (6th Cir. 1994) (same).
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have concluded that a state agency decision that was approved by a
federal agency merits deference on the ground that the court is
essentially deferring to the federal agency's review of the state
46
agency's decision.
Despite the Supreme Court's inattention to whether the
Chevron doctrine ever applies to state agency interpretations of federal law, it has explicitly declined to rule out this possibility. In a
footnote in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, for example, the Court
implied that a deferential review standard might be appropriate in
the Medicaid context, noting that:
the Courts of Appeals generally agree that when the State has complied with
the procedural requirements imposed by the amendment and regulations [for
instance, the development of a plan through certain procedures and the approval of that plan by HCFA], a federal court employs a deferential standard of
review to evaluate whether the rates comply with the substantive [legal] requirements [of the Medicaid Act]. 47

Although the split of authority among the courts of appeals concerning the standard of review of state agency implementation of the
Medicaid Act has not yet triggered Supreme Court review, the enactment of the Telecom Act-which is sure to generate considerable
litigation on the standard of review for cooperative federalism
schemes-makes it only a matter of time before the Court considers
the relationship of Chevron and cooperative federalism regulatory
schemes.
III. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS LANDSCAPE AND THE TELECOM ACT
In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress fundamentally changed our nation's telecommunications laws and assigned state agencies another important area of federal law to implement. The Act's central goal is to open up the nation's historically
monopolized local telephone markets to competition through a cooperative federalism regulatory program that involves the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), state agencies, and the federal
courts."
To help accomplish this objective, the Act specifically
46. Cf llinoisHealth CareAss'n, 983 F.2d at 1462-63 ("[Ihe Illinois reimbursement plan
was approved by the Secretary and thus is a product of state and federal agency action.... [It]
must be reviewed with the deference accorded federal agency actions!).
47. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520 n.18 (1990).
48. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2337-38 (1997) (describing the 1996
Telecom Act as "an unusually important legislative enactment" whose "major components...
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charges federal district courts with overseeing decisions made by
state administrative agencies regarding the terms and conditions of
the interconnection agreements that govern-pursuant to federal
statutory standards-the relations between incumbent providers and
new entrants into the local telephone market. It does not, however,
set forth the appropriate standard of review for such cases. To explain the importance and the practical effect of the standard of review, this Part first outlines the relevant history of telecommunications regulation and then explains the relationship between state
agencies and the federal courts in implementing the Telecom Act.
A. TelecommunicationsLaw Before the 1996 Telecom Act
Throughout most of this century, the FCC and state agencies
coexisted according to a system of shared responsibility where the
FCC generally oversaw interstate service and the state agencies
(usually Public Utility Commissions, or "PUCs") oversaw intrastate
service. The Communications Act of 1934 clearly set forth this division of responsibility in section 2(b), which precluded the FCC from
4
adopting any regulations governing intrastate telephone services. 9
Because calls across state, or even national, boundaries all begin with
the local network, this division of responsibility required the FCC and
the states to ascertain which jurisdiction would regulate the rates of
which service. This "jurisdictional separations process," as it is often
called, was spawned by Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., where
the Supreme Court ruled that the separation of interstate from intrawere designed to promote competition in the local telephone service market."); U.S. W.
Communications, Inc. v. Hix, 986 F. Supp. 13, 14 (D. Colo. 1997) ("The Act, at its core, is
designed, among other things, to end monopolies in the local telephone market and open the
market to competition."); Glen 0. Robinson, The "Wew" CommunicationsAct: A Second Opinion,
29 CONN. L. REV.289, 304 (1996) ("[N]ext to [the telephony provisions,] all other parts of the Act
pale in importance."); Gregory L. Rosston, The 1996 Telecommunications Act Trilogy, 5 MEDIA
L. & POLY, Winter 1996, at 1, 3 (summarizing provisions of the Telecom Act that encourage
competition).
49. Section 2(b) provides that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to
give the [FCC] jurisdiction with respect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services,
facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service."
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, title I, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064. Under this proviso, the FCC
may not regulate intrastate matters unless they are impossible to divide from interstate ones
and where the state rule, absent preemption, would negate the federal policy. See Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 n.4 (1986) [hereinafter Louisiana PSC]. For a
succinct review of the law before and after LouisianaPSC, see Michael J. Zpevak, The Current
Law ofFCC Preemption, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci & TECH. 105 (1996). In short, the basic approach called
for under LouisianaPSC and its progeny is that if there is any method to separate the subject
matter being regulated, it must be done and thus preemption is not appropriate. See id. at 11011.
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state telephone revenue was necessary to recognize the competent
governmental authority in each sphere. 5°
In 1974, modern telecommunications law began to take shape
with the filing of an antitrust action against AT&T, alleging that its
control over its local Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") had impeded
competition in the related long distance, equipment manufacturing,
information services, and other adjacent markets.5 1 In 1982, AT&T
agreed to settle the case, entering into a consent decree that required
it to divest the local BOCs into seven newly created operating
companies. 52 In approving the divestiture, Judge Harold Greene
made clear that he considered the local telephone exchange a "natural
monopoly" because the local network infrastructure-especially the
wires connecting end users to local wire centers, often referred to as
"the local loop"-was far too expensive to be replaced by a competitive
local exchange carrier. 53 In addition, by contemplating future waivers
of the decree's restrictions, 54 Judge Greene installed himself as a third
overseer of the telecommunications industry.5 5 Moreover, the institution of a waiver process recognized that changes in technology and
innovations in regulation could change the telecommunications industry from a regulated monopoly industry to a competitive marketplace.

50. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148 (1930). In the wake of Smith,
Congress codified this principle in the Communications Act. Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, title I, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064; see also 47 C.F.R. § 36 (1997) (setting forth regulations for cost
allocation between the two jurisdictions); MIcHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw 88-89 (1992) (noting the Telecom Act's inadequate treatment of
federallstate jurisdictional issues). In essence, this process of identifying the services to be
regulated by each jurisdiction ensures that interstate service providers are charged (a regulated
rate) for their use of the local network to provide originating and terminating access to the end
user. For a basic explanation of the division of costs between the two jurisdictions, see National
Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissions v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1103-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam).
51. See United States v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1352, 1357,
1374-75, 1379-81 (D.D.C. 1981).
52. See United States v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 131, 140-42 (D.D.C.
1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
53. See id. at 223. As one commentator has noted, in a natural monopoly,
competition cannot thrive because a bigger firm is more efficient and will therefore grow
at the expense of a smaller rival [and] competition would be inefficient, because one way
or another it involves splitting the market, with the result that no firm is as big (that is,
efficient) as it could be.
Joseph Farrell, CreatingLocal Competition, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 201-02 (1996).
54. See AT&T Communications, 552 F. Supp. at 195 (holding that waiver of line-ofbusiness restriction is warranted "upon a showing that there is no substantial possibility that
an Operating Company could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the relevant
market").
55. See Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications
Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 852 (1997) (noting that once Judge Greene entered the AT&T
consent decree, it became "the nation's leading source of telecommunications law").
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B. The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996
In the wake of the changes that Judge Greene had anticipated
might occur in telecommunications technology and in the
marketplace, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996
to, as the Conference Report put it, "provide for a pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
Instituting a new
telecommunications markets to competition."5
legal framework to facilitate competition in the local telephone
a massive
overhaul in our nation's
market required
telecommunications laws. Over the years, the FCC was able to
address many important telecommunications issues-such as the
development of a regulatory regime for cable television-based on the
general public interest mandate set out in the Communications Act of
1934. 57 In crafting the Telecom Act, however, Congress did not choose
to authorize the FCC (or the state PUCs) to formulate the primary
details of how local telephone markets would be opened, but instead
chartered many of the basic principles itself, specifically outlining the
essential market opening requirements in sections 251 and 252 of the
Act.58 Thus, for example, Congress envisioned and provided for three
paths of entry into the local telephone market-the building of
facilities-based networks (which would be interconnected to the
incumbent provider's facilities), 59 the use of network elements
"unbundled" from the incumbent provider's local network,60 and the
56. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124 (Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference).
57. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 303(r) in holding that the FCC may regulate cable television by issuing "'such rules
and regulations and prescrib[ing] such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,' as
'public convenience, interest, or necessity requires' ").
58. Although not addressed here, the Telecom Act also includes a number of other
important provisions related to the emergence of competition in all telecommunications
markets. Notably, the Act: (1) provides for preemption of state (and local) legal barriers to
entry, see 47 U.S.C.A. § 253 (West Supp. 1998); AT&T Communications, Inc. v. City of Austin,
975 F. Supp. 928, 942 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (applying section 253 of the Act); (2) mandates a
transition from the present system of cross-subsidies between different services (and users) to
an explicit, competitively neutral system of universal service support that is compatible with
competitive markets, see 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp. 1998); and (3) institutes a process for
Bell Company entry into long distance markets in their region, see id. § 271; SBC
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 138 F.3d 410, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing provision).
59. See 47 U.S.CA- § 251(c)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (establishing a duty to interconnect).
60. See id. § 251(c)(3) (establishing a duty to sell individual elements unbundled from the
incumbenes network). The Act defines the term "network element" as:
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reselling of the services offered by the incumbent local
providers6--and specified the pricing regime for each of these entry
vehicles. In arbitrating the agreements between the incumbent
providers and the new entrants, the state agencies implementing the
Act must respect this scheme, and the federal courts who oversee
their decisions are charged with ensuring that they do so.
C. Federal-StateRelations Under the Telecom Act
In setting out the congressionally mandated local competition
rules, the FCC recognized the difficult position that the state agencies
and federal district courts would be in without some important guidance on certain of the ambiguous statutory terms and gaps in the
Telecom Act and thus issued regulations on a number of topics. In so
doing, the FCC sought to limit the occasions in which the state
agencies and federal courts would have no federal guidance on gaps or
ambiguities in the statute; even with these regulations in force,
however, the state agencies would still have been required to answer
interpretive questions not addressed by the FCC regulations or the
Act itself.62 Moreover, after the Eighth Circuit invalidated-on
jurisdictional grounds-a number of the regulations contained in the
FCC's Local Competition Order,6 3 the scope of such questions grew
markedly, leaving both the state agencies and the federal courts with
less guidance as they each proceeded to interpret the Telecom Act's
statutory commands.

a facility or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications service. Such term
also includes features, functions, and capabilities that are provided by means of such
facility or equipment, including subscriber numbers, databases, signaling systems, and
information sufficient for billing and collection or used in the transmission, routing, or
other provision of a telecommunications service.

Id. § 153(29).
61.
62.

See id. § 251(c)(4).
In this respect, the Telecom Act parallels numerous other statutory schemes where

Congress sets out general principles and the courts-or in the administrative state, agencies-are charged with "fill[ing] up the details." United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517
(1911); see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 441-42 (7th Cir.

1994) (en banc) (stating that in the administrative state, "the agency acts as a congressional
proxy; Congress develops the statutory framework and directs the agency to flesh out the
operational details"), affd sub nonm. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 516 U.S. 152 (1996) (not discussing the point).
63. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of
1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996) (1st Report & Order) [hereinafter Local Competition Order],
rev'd in part & offid in part sub non. Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 819-20 (8th Cir.
1997), and rev'd in part and affd in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., No. 97-826,
1999 WL 24568 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1999).
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In the wake of the Eighth Circuit's decision to invalidate a
number of the FCC's regulations in Iowa UtilitiesBoard v. FCC,much
of the burden of interpreting the Act's requirements rested, at least in
the first instance, with the state regulatory authorities. In the Iowa
Utilities Board case, the FCC argued to the Eighth Circuit that the
Act's call for nationwide rulemaking on the rules for local competition
authorized it to define all aspects of these rules. 64 Thus, on the FCC's
view, it was authorized not simply to determine what elements of the
incumbent's network needed to be "unbundled," but also to devise the
pricing methodology that the States would follow. 65 After initially
ordering a stay of the FCC's pricing rules, 66 the Eighth Circuit later

invalidated those and several other regulations set forth in the FCC's
Local Competition Order.67 In so doing, the court relied heavily on
Section 2(b) of the Communications Act, which, as the Eighth Circuit
put it, "fenced off' intrastate telephone services from FCC regulation.68 Although the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's
69
decision on the jurisdictional issue (as well as a number of others),
the reinstatement of the FCC's regulations still leaves the state
agencies with considerable discretion in implementing federal law.70

64. Iowa Util. Bd., 120 F.3d at 794-95; see also 47 U.S.CA- § 251(d)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
65. See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,508. For a good description of the FCCs
Local Competition Order, see INGO VOGELSANG & BRDGER 1M MIrCHE TELECOMMUNICATONS
COMPER

ON: THE LASTTENMILS 227-50 (1997).

66. See Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 421 (8th Cir. 1996), motion to vacate stay
denied, 520 U.S. 83 (1996), and rev'd in part and aff'd in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util.
Bd., No. 97-826, 1999 WL 24568 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1999)..
67. See Iowa Util.Bd., 120 F.3d at 819 n.39.
68. Id. at 796 (quoting LouisianaPSC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986)). For criticism of this ruling, see Jim Chen, Telric in Turmoil, Telecommunications In Transition: A Note on the Iowa
UtilitiesBoard Litigation, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 51, 78 (1998) (arguing that nothing in the
legislative history supports the Eighth Circuit's reading of the Telecom Act); Duane
McLaughlin, Note, FCC JurisdictionOver Local Telephone Under the 1996 Act: Fenced Off?, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2210, 2240-42 (1997) (arguing that the Eighth Circuits approach denies that
the Telecom Act changed the FCC's jurisdiction). Because the issue of whether the state
agencies implementing the Act deserve deference remains an important question even after the
Supreme Courts decision in Iowa Utilities Board, this Article does not address the merits-or
lack thereof-of the Eighth Circuit's decision in that case. See Chen, supra, at 78 (noting that
even if Iowa Utilities Board were reversed, the state agencies would still be the ones charged
with "interstitial legislative authority" on setting the terms and conditions of physical
collocation).
69. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., No. 97-826, 1999 WL 24568 at *15 (U.S. Jan. 25,
1999).
70. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. Indeed, the majority opinion in Iowa
Utilities Board noted explicitly that the Court will eventually have to resolve the novel issue
examined by this Article. 1999 WL 24568, at *9 n.10 (scheme put in place by Telecom Act "is
decidedly novel, and the attendant legal questions, such as whether federal courts must defer to
state agency interpretations of federal law, are novel as well").
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The FCC's role in implementing the Telecom Act will vary not
only depending on how it chooses to exercise its authority (i.e.,
whether it chooses to leave certain decisions to state agencies), but
also on whether the state agencies decline to assume the role of
implementing the Telecom Act. If a state agency declines the!
opportunity to oversee the development of interconnection agreements, that role is to be assumed by the FCC.71 Where a state agency
accepts the role of implementing the Telecom Act, 72 all incumbent
providers are obligated to negotiate in good faith with new entrants to
determine the terms and conditions for the necessary arrangements
between them73 and to submit any interconnection agreement reached
between them for approval to the state agency. 74 If the parties are
unable to reach an agreement, either may petition the state agency to
arbitrate any disputed issues and to order the parties to comply with
certain terms and conditions. 75 If a party believes that the arbitrated
agreement fails to meet the standards set out in the Act or in binding
FCC regulations, it may challenge those aspects of the agreement in
federal district court.76

71. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(e)(5) (West Supp. 1998). Thus far, no state agency has refused
to assume the role provided to it in the Telecom Act.
72. By offering the state agencies the option not to participate in the federal regulatory
scheme, the Telecom Act does not commandeer state agencies as condemned in Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 28, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2380 (1997). See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. BellSouth
Telecomm., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 766, 772 (E.D. Ky. 1998) ("Because the Act allows the State to
either participate in the regulation of the telecommunications systems or to be preempted in
that field of regulation, the Act is a permissible exercise of Congress' power."). Indeed, this
model of inviting state agencies to implement federal telecommunications law has been
employed previously in the Pole Attachment Act, which authorized the FCC to regulate pole

attachments only if a state agency had declined to do so pursuant to certain federal
requirements. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 224(c) (West Supp. 1998) (providing that FCC may regulate
rates, terms, and conditions of pole attachments, but only in the absence of state regulation or
state compliance with specified procedural requirements).
73. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251(c)(1), 252(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
74. See id. § 252(e)(1).
75. See id. § 252(b).
76. See id. § 252(e)(6). This procedure, providing for suit against state agencies in federal
district court, has been challenged repeatedly on Eleventh Amendment grounds under Seminole
Tribe v. Florida,517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996). Almost (if not entirely) uniformly, the federal district courts that have addressed the constitutionality of this procedure have upheld it on the
ground that such suits are authorized by Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), or that the state
agency waived its immunity by choosing to take part in the federal statutory scheme. See, e.g.,
U.S. W. Communications, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 991 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (D. Utah 1998)
(upholding suit against commissioners based on Exparte Young); U.S. W. Communications, Inc.
v. TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (upholding suit based on theory that
state waived its sovereign immunity).
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D. Federal CourtReview of State Agency Decisions
Under the Telecom Act
In enacting the Telecom Act, Congress specified an important
role for the federal courts in bringing competition to local telephony,
but did not instruct them on what standard to use in reviewing the
decisions of the state agencies.7 7 On issues of fact gathering, the federal courts that have addressed the issue have generally agreed that
the state agency administrative process must not be replicated in
federal district court and that the court is to limit its review to the
administrative record.78 In so holding, the federal courts have concluded that Supreme Court precedent governing judicial review of
federal agency proceedings also applies to judicial review of state
agency proceedings when it comes to development of a factual record.79

In contrast to their review of factual disputes, the federal
courts have declined to accord state agencies the same respect accorded to federal agencies when it comes to construing ambiguous
statutory terms or filling gaps in the Telecom Act.80 In line with the
cases discussed in Part II.C, the federal district courts have usually
77. The Act, in relevant part, provides that where a state agency carries out the role of
approving or arbitrating interconnection agreements under federal law, "any party aggrieved by
such determination may bring an action in an appropriate federal district court to determine
whether the agreement or statement [of terms made available to all entrants] meets the requirements of section 251 and this section." 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(e)(6) (West Supp. 1998); see also
U.S. W. Communications v. Hix, 986 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.Colo. 1997) (noting that "[t]he Act does
not elucidate either the scope of review or the standard of review" of state agency
determinations); id. at 17 ("Because of the unique framework of the Act, it does not appear that
there is an analogous statutory scheme that assists me with the standard of review
determination.").
78. See, e.g., Hix,986 F. Supp. at 15 (holding that scope of review is to be limited to the
administrative record).
79. See, e.g., id. (holding that when no standard is specified in the statute, review of
administrative proceedings is "to be confined to the administrative record" and no de novo
proceeding may be held).
80. See AT&T Communications Corp. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1097,
1100 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (stating that every court to address the issue has held that "it is not
appropriate to defer to [a] state agency's interpretations of federal law"); AT&T Communications
Corp. v. Pacific Bell, No. C97-0080SI, 1998 WL 246652, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1998)
(adopting de novo standard for federal law questions and arbitrary and capricious standard for
all other questions); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecom., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 674
(E.D.N.C. 1998) (adopting the Hix standard of review); U.S. W. Communications, Inc. v. TCG
Seattle, No. C97-354WD, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 1998) (stating that state agency's
interpretation receives de novo review); U.S. W. Communications, Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc.,
No. C97-222WD, 1998 WL 350588, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 7, 1998) (adopting de novo standard
of review); GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517, 524 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that if
an agency is not federal its decisions receive less deference); Hix, 986 F. Supp. at 13 (stating
that state agency determinations are not granted the same deference as federal agency
determinations).
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distinguished between deference to state agencies and to federal
agencies on the ground that deference to state agencies cannot assist
in the development of a uniform interpretation of federal law.81
Accordingly, these decisions have concluded that the presumption
established in Chevron-that Congress intended for an administering
federal agency to define ambiguous statutory concepts-should not be
extended to state agencies.
Because the state agencies are assigned the critical role of
arbitrating disputes over the terms and conditions on which the new
entrants and the incumbent provider will do business, their decisions
will materially affect the nature and pace of competitive entry into
the local telephone market. An issue that perhaps best exemplifies
the role that the state agencies may play in implementing the Act is
how to define the pricing standard for unbundled access to elements
of the incumbent's network. The Act explains that unbundled network elements are to be priced at "just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates,"82 and that such rates must be "based on... cost
(determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based
proceeding)," 83 but it fails to provide a precise definition of what constitutes "cost"-based rates for unbundled elements. Even though
federal courts will, under the Supreme Court's ruling in Iowa Utilities
Board, be able to rely on FCC regulations regarding the pricing of
unbundled elements, it is still worth examining this issue because
some of the challenges involved in implementing the Act's standards
will persist even with the FCC regulations in place and, "more
importantly, because this issue exemplifies the importance of judicial
forbearance in superintending intricate regulatory matters. 84
Although the FCC's jurisdiction to define the "cost"-based
pricing standard has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Iowa
Utilities Board, there are likely to be a variety of other issues where
(1) the FCC left issues to be decided by state agencies; and (2) the Act
assigned decisions to be made by the state agencies in the first
instance. In terms of the first set of issues, it is worth noting that the
FCC left it to the state agencies to decide whether network elements
other than the ones denoted in its Local Competition Order should be
"unbundled" by the local incumbent provider. 85 As for the second set
81.

See, e.g., Hix,986 F. Supp. at 17-18.

82.
83.

47 U.S.CA. § 251(c)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1998).
Id. § 252(d)(1)(A).

84. See infra Part V.B.2.
85. The FCC identified a number of network elements that, at a minimum, must be
"unbundled," see Specific Unbundling Requirements, 47 C.F.R. § 51.319 (1997); Local
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of issues, the Telecom Act itself may be interpreted as delegating to
the state agencies the responsibility of resolving many of the issues
related to the development of appropriate arrangements for the
collocation of competitors' facilities in the offices of the incumbent
providers (for purposes of either interconnection or obtaining unbundled access). 86 Thus, even though the Supreme Court determined that
the Act assigns a broad role to the FCC to resolve statutory
ambiguities and gaps that might otherwise be addressed by state
agencies (such as the definition of the "cost"-based pricing standard
for unbundled elements), the state agencies will still be forced to
interpret many ambiguities or gaps in the Telecom Act without
guidance from the FCC. Indeed, even if the Act is ultimately read to
grant residual lawmaking authority to the FCC on all matters (and to
delegate no issues exclusively to state agencies), the state agencies
will still confront some statutory interpretation issues in the first
instance, for no other reason than that the FCC cannot-and should
not-be expected to anticipate and address every interstitial gap or
87
ambiguity in the Act.

IV. THE RATIONALES FOR DEFERENCE

Given the increasing number of federal statutes that charge
state agencies with the responsibility of interpreting federal law in
the absence of federal agency precedent or discernible statutory
guidance, courts and commentators must grapple with whether
reviewing courts should defer to state agency decisions on how to
address statutory ambiguities or gaps. As outlined in this Part, an
examination of three important rationales for the Chevron
doctrine-the fact that Congress delegates to an agency the
responsibility of making certain decisions in the first instance, the
comparative institutional competence of agencies over courts in
Competition Order,11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,624, 15,683 (1996), but state commissions are free to

require additional elements to be made available (either as a matter of federal or, in some cases,
state law). Indeed, one court has already noted this fact and concluded that "dark fiber'-the
unlit fiber optic conduits in the local network-constitutes a network element despite the fact
that the FCC did not so determine in its Local Competition Order. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 674, 679-80 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
86. See Chen, supra note 68, at 78 ('Congress needed to choose between federal and state
regulatory expertise in a variety of circumstances demanding delegation of interstitial legislative authority. In most of those circumstances, Congress chose the FCC; in collocation,
Congress preferred the state commissions.").
87. Moreover, the FCC might well choose to leave some matters to the state agencies under such a scenario.
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making certain types of decisions, and the superior ability of agencies
to fill gaps in complex statutory schemes-suggests that such
deference is appropriate. Moreover, by according deference to state
agencies charged with implementing cooperative federalism statutes,
federal courts can help effectuate the underlying purposes of such
schemes:
to encourage individual tailoring by and competition
between different states in implementing a federal statute, provided
that they do so in a manner that is compatible with federal statutory
precepts.88 Quite understandably, federal courts have been reluctant
to give effect to such a model of federal regulation, for, among other
reasons, it departs markedly from the New Deal vision of and the
long-standing rhetorical support for uniformity above all and little or
no role for state agencies in implementing federal law. 89
Although deferring to state agency decisions challenges the
notion of federal judicial supremacy embodied in the Hunter's Lessee
dictum, it is hardly an untested approach in our jurisprudence.
Indeed, the failure of the aggressive review of state ratemaking
decisions that was abandoned in the mid-part of this century can be
seen as important evidence in favor of deferring to state agencies who
implement federal law. Accordingly, after this Part outlines how
three important rationales for Chevron deference and the values of
cooperative federalism suggest that deference to state agencies makes
good sense (especially with respect to the Telecom Act), it then
reviews the history of the ratemaking cases to illustrate why intrusive
judicial review of complex regulatory decisions does not.
A Applying Chevron to CooperativeFederalismSchemes
Whether Chevron's presumption-that gaps, ambiguities, or
silences in federal statutes are to be decided by agencies, not
courts9O-applies to cooperative federalism schemes, like the Telecom
88.

See Lisa B. Deutsch, Medicaid Payment for Organ Transplants: The Extent of

Mandated Coverage, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 185, 207-08 (1997) ("The cooperative

federalism relationship that the Medicaid Act sought to encourage between the federal
government and the individual state governments was designed to accommodate change and to
provide flexibility.").
89.

See

Michael

C. Doff & Charles

F.

Sabel, A

Constitution of Democratic

Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 315 (1998) C"A central lesson of the limitations of New
Deal institutions is that effective government services and regulations must be continuously
adapted and recombined to respond to diverse and changing local conditions.").
90. As Chief Judge Posner has noted, Chevron's "domain consists of statutory gaps
(fissures, puzzles, anomalies, etc.) that Congress has left for the agency administering the
statute in question to fill; the court is not to second-guess the agency's gap-filling unless the

agency is being unreasonable'
(7th Cir. 1998).

First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.3d 457, 459
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Act, raises the question of how to conceptualize the role played by a
state agency in such schemes. In Chevron, the Supreme Court
examined this question as to federal agencies implementing
regulatory statutes and concluded that Congress should be presumed
to intend that agencies, and not the federal courts, are the bodies
charged with developing statutory policies left implicit in a regulatory
statute.91 For the same reasons that it gave with respect to federal
agencies, the Supreme Court should also defer to state agency
First, such
interpretations of cooperative federalism statutes.
schemes delegate to state agencies the responsibility of interpreting
and applying federal law. Second, state agencies enjoy superior institutional competence over reviewing courts in addressing matters that
are often inextricably linked to their substantive expertise. Third,
gap-filling in complex regulatory statutes can be effectuated better by
agencies-who are focused on the entire statute and not simply on the
particular provision at issue in a given case-than by courts. This
section addresses each point in turn, using the Telecom Act to
illustrate the strength of these arguments.
1. Delegation
In enacting the Telecom Act, Congress could have written a
law without state agency involvement by delegating the entire array
of interpretive responsibilities to the FCC. It chose not to do so,
however. Thus, although the FCC enjoys important responsibilities
under the Act, it is quite clear that there will be numerous situations
where no FCC regulation addresses a question of statutory interpretation that is presented to a state agency. In these situations,
Congress will have charged the state agencies with implementing the
Act and developing, at least in the first instance, an appropriate
definition of the ambiguity or gap in the statutory scheme. In a
recent discussion of Chevron, the Supreme Court made clear that in
such cases it presumes that "Congress, when it left ambiguity in a
statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the
91. It is worth noting that the exact reason for the shift taken in Chevron has never been
clearly established. Commentators have explained that Chevron represents either a sensible
default rule against which Congress can legislate, a presumption that reflects congressional
intent, or an application of separation of powers principles that keeps courts out of the lawmaking business. Although I refer to Chevron as approximating congressional intent, the other two
conceptions of the Chevron doctrine also comfortably support the application of Chevron to state
agencies. For a concise review of all three conceptions, see Quincy M. Crawford, Comment,
Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretationsthat Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction,
61 U. CI. L. REV. 957, 959-60 (1994).
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ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows."92
In enacting the Telecom Act, Congress did not expect that
either the statute or the FCC would be able to ensure that the state
agencies confronted no gaps or ambiguities in implementing the Act.
To be sure, Congress did clearly address a number of points in the
Telecom Act and plainly contemplated that the FCC would be able to
address a number of other issues. 93 But Congress also envisioned that
the state agencies would have an independent role in implementing a
number of the Act's provisions. 94 Because the Telecom Act charges
state agencies (if they choose to accept the task) with the responsibility of interpreting some of its ambiguous terms and gaps in the first

instance, the federal courts should defer to them on those matters
rather than take on the job of interpreting the statutory gaps and
ambiguities.9 5 To do otherwise would have the effect of "dump[ing]
the problem [of making sense of the Telecom Act] in the lap of the
courts, taking advantage of the fact that the courts are a kind of political lightning rod.... [with] a mandate, though no specific directions."9 Such an approach would both disserve those courts that
92. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996); see also Stinson v. United States, 508
U.S. 36, 44 (1993) (stating that when Congress leaves gaps in statutes, it means for agencies to
fill the gaps); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) ('When Congress,
through express delegation or the introduction of an interpretative gap in the statutory structure, has delegated policy making authority to an administrative agency, the extent of judicial
review of the agency's policy determinations is limited.").
93. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C-A. § 251(b)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (charging the FCC with developing
nationwide rules for number portability).
94. A number of other cooperative federalism schemes, such as the pre-Welfare Reform
Act Aid to Families with Dependent Children C'AFDC*), have worked similarly. See, e.g., Deel
v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1079, 1083 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ('Congress cannot prescribe every
detail of a program as complex as AFDC. If it could, state agencies would serve no independent
purpose.").
95. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (stating that a "precondition
to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority");
Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) ('ITlhe first question in
determining the deference appropriate to the agency's construction is whether Congress has
transferred discretion [to interpret the statute] to the agency."); Anthony, supra note 35, at 42
("[Tihe key question in each case is whether Congress delegated the authority to issue
interpretations with the force of law in this format").
96. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 290 (1985). The federal
courts assume a "political lightning rod" role when they must make sense out of ambiguous
statutes not superintended by regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 261 (1994) ("It is entirely possible-indeed, highly probable-that, because it was
unable to resolve the retroactivity issue... Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be
resolved by the courts."). This role differs from the more venerable tradition of developing
judge-made rules based upon a common law statute such as the Sherman Act or the NLRA.
See, e.g., National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (stating that
Sherman Act invites "courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on
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attempt to undertake this responsibility as well as the cooperative
federalism schemes that the state agencies are charged with implementing.
Respecting a congressional delegation to state agencies under a
cooperative federalism scheme does raise the question of whether
Congress should be permitted to delegate interpretive authority to an
agency that is not directly accountable to it. Some have criticized
such an approach on the ground that Congress should not be allowed
to devise a federal scheme that does not allow it to influence
regulatory policy; correlatively, these critics have suggested that such
schemes may also allow Congress to disclaim responsibility for the
ensuing policy decisions.97 As an initial matter, it is worth noting that
Congress wields considerable sway over policy in cooperative
federalism schemes, as states must attend to Congress' wishes lest
they jeopardize the significant sums of money that it sends to them
every year or face possible preemption of their decisions. 98 Second,
the presence of congressional oversight does not appear to be the
touchstone of Chevron deference in any event, as other nonaccountable actors, such as the Federal Reserve and the Federal
Sentencing Commission, appear to enjoy Chevron deference. 9
Finally, in the case of state agencies, delegations of interpretive
authority also advance federalism interests and allow Congress to
pursue a policy of diversity and experimentation within a federal
scheme.100 Indeed, the threat of assigning interpretive authority to
common-law tradition!); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)
(noting that "courts must fashion [operative rules] from the policy of our national labor laws" in
applying section 301 of the NLRA); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of
FederalCourts, 52 U. Cal. L. REV. 1, 40-46 (1985) (stating that the Labor Act and Sherman Act
are paradigmatic examples of implied delegations of lawmaking authority to the federal courts).
In the latter case, Congress leaves a field open to federal common law based upon a broad
instruction; in the former, Congress leaves specific issues undefined because it could not reach
agreement on how to do so.
97. See Joshua D. Sarnoff CooperativeFederalism, the Delegationof Federal Power, and
the Constitution,39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 243-55, 270.80 (1997) (criticizing such statutory regimes).
98. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-ChoiceExplanationof Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265,
286 (1990) (noting the effects that congressional control of spending and the threat of
preemption have on states).
99. The question of whether the Federal Sentencing Commission merits Chevron deference is hardly settled, but the Supreme Court has intimated as much. See Stinson v. United
States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1993). Moreover, three Justices have already reached this conclusion. See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 1687 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1679 n.6 (leaving this question open).
100. Some have suggested that the absence of executive branch oversight raises separation
of powers problems with such delegations. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 28, 117 S. Ct.
2365, 2378 (1997) (suggesting possible separation of powers concerns, but noting that they are
significantly reduced if the state agency's role in a federal scheme is voluntary); Evan
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state-as well as federal-agencies may well enable Congress to
ensure that both sets of actors are more responsive to its wishes, as
the agencies of the two jurisdictions will be forced to compete with one
another to maintain any grip on delegated authority. After all,
[t]he history of cooperative federalism is, in part, a history of struggles between elected policy generalists-mayors, governors, state legislatures, and
city councils-and federal agency specialists for greater control over federal
programs with Congress favoring one or another type of organization depending on the political climate and perceived regulatory needs.101

2. Institutional Competence
As a modification to Marbury's mandate that courts must remain the final arbiter on questions of law, Chevron instructs courts to
acknowledge the important role played by expert agencies in the
modern administrative state. In essence, Chevron recognizes that the
judiciary's limited ability to gather and process information, its commitment to precedent and reasoning by analogy, and its insulation
from the political process weaken its ability to define ambiguous
terms in regulatory statutes. Regulatory agencies, on the other hand,
have access to the necessary information (in other words, the ability
to gather and process information through methods unavailable to the
judiciary), are versed in the intricacies of what often are complex,
technical, and interrelated statutory schemes, and are able to respond
to the concerns of democratically elected officials.12 As Chevron exCaminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration ofFederalLaw, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
1075, 1111-12 (1997) (calling for more attention to the issue and concluding that separation of
powers concerns demand either "weak" executive supervision or invalidation of the statutory regime). These concerns, however, like those relating to the need for congressional oversight, also
argue against delegations of interpretive authority to independent federal agencies, such as the
Federal Reserve, and would require the overruling of long-standing Supreme Court decisions.
See Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization,and Globalization: Separationof Powers Limits
on CongressionalAuthority to Assign FederalPower to Non-FederalActors, 50 RUTGERS L. REv.
331, 382-83 (1998) ("Congress has made, and the Court has upheld, assignments of administrative functions to nonfederal actors in a remarkable number of cases spanning the
Constitution's existence."). Moreover, even some advocates of a "unitary executive" theory-that calls for executive oversight of any executive function-justify delegations to state
agencies without such oversight on federalism grounds. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting
the Unitary Executive.: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the
FederalGovernment, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 72-73, 102 (1990).
101. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of CooperativeFederalism. Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and Dual Sovereignty Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 883 (1998).
102. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) ("[P]ractical
agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference."); Mayburg v.
Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984) ("The fact that a
question is closely related to an agency's area of expertise may give an agency greater 'power to

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

plained, courts historically have deferred to agency decisions wherever "a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy" depends
"upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected
to agency regulation."103 More recently, the Supreme Court put this
point in even more forceful terms: "[H]istorical familiarity and policymaking expertise account in the first instance for the presumption
that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the agency
rather than to the reviewing court."'10 4 Thus, the Chevron principle
acknowledges that judicial forbearance on certain statutory questions
will yield a better result than de novo review.0S
If the federal courts resist Chevron's admonition and step into
a policymaking function by insisting on de novo review of complex
regulatory issues decided by state agencies, they will take policy
decisions away from state policymakers and risk incurring an institutional cost. 106 By declining to defer to state agencies, courts risk suffering three distinct types of institutional harm: (1) causing bad results through their involvement in policy decisions for which they are
ill-suited; (2) damaging their perceived legitimacy if they are seen as
making pure policy decisions; and (3) acting undemocratically by
depriving accountable policymakers of the opportunity to make such
decisions. A cautionary tale in this regard is the federal courts' review of state ratemaking decisions over the first half of this century.
persuade.' "); Perine v. William Norton & Co., 509 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that
deference is to be given to agencies "on the basis of the agency's superior expertise in the area of
its authority); Marshall J. Berger, Administrative Law and LaborLaw: The Supreme Court's
1991-92 Docket, 7 ADMIN. L.J. 257, 261 (1993) ('Judicial deference is rooted in the concept that
the administrative agency assigned lawmaking power by Congress has greater 'historical
familiarity and policymaking expertise' than the reviewing court."). As the Eighth Circuit has
observed in the Medicaid Act context, the Health Care Financing Administration has more
expertise in the area than the courts. See Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d
1291, 1295 (8th Cir. 1987); cf First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.3d 457, 459 (7th
Cir. 1998) ("The Internal Revenue Service knows more about the tax laws than the judges of the
federal appellate courts do, and so it is natural for us to give some weight to its views about the
meaning and application of those laws.").
103. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991).
105. See Crawford, supra note 91, at 980 (If agencies do not have an institutional
advantage over courts in interpreting statutes, little purpose would be served by the Chevron
doctrine."); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law and Policy, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 821, 824 (1990) ('Chevron rests on the sound premise that agencies enjoy a
comparative institutional advantage as a matter of legitimacy in resolving ambiguities in
legislation they are charged with interpreting.").
106. This would be no small irony, as the Telecom Act aspired to end the judicial policymaking of Judge Greene's oversight of the AT&T consent decree. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104230, at 201 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 215 (stating that purpose of Act was to
end "government by consent decree"); 141 CONG. REc. H8451 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (remarks
ofRep. Bliley) ('[lit is time for Congress to retake the field.").
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Initially, the federal courts viewed themselves as competent to make
intricate judgments about whether a particular approach to ratemaking was acceptable under takings principles because they believed
that there was a single "righf' answer on how to compensate utilities
for the use of their assets. But once the Supreme Court realized that
its oversight of this area was equivalent to the sort of policymaking
decisions made by a legislature, it adopted a more deferential attitude
07
toward the regulatory bodies that handled ratemaking decisions.
Thus, before the federal courts embark on an intrusive judicial review
of the intricate issues involved in implementing the Telecom
Act-such as the setting of terms and conditions for the prices of
network elements-they should consider the fact that they are
displacing the actions of politically accountable actors and may suffer
an institutional cost as a result.
The heart of the Chevron doctrine is a judicial recognition that
in matters of policy, administrative agencies are presumptively more
suited to the task than courts.10 8 Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently noted, the dispute at issue in Chevron itself-the meaning of
the Clean Air Act's concept of a "stationary source"-indicates that
"the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a question of policy than of law" and thus properly resolved by policymakers,
not courts. 1°9 To ignore this recognition and undertake an intrusive
judicial review of the implementation of regulatory statutes by state
agencies would be a mistake, as "courts really have little to contribute
107. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1392 (1997)
("Once the matter is viewed as a matter of policy, it follows quite quickly that the matter is for

legislatures, not courts.").
108. See id. at 1410 (noting that in the administrative state, "[i]nterpretation seemed less
law finding than law making, and this law making by courts raised an illegitimacy cost. In.

Chevron, the Court acknowledged this cost, at least in the context of ambiguous statutes.");
John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference to Agency Interpretationsof
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625 (1996) ("Chevronembraces the assumption that if a

silent or ambiguous statute leaves an interpreter room to choose among reasonable alternative
understandings, the interpretive choice entails the exercise of substantial policymaking
discretion."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225,

2228 (1997) (stating that Chevron "recognized that any time Congress enacts a statute that does
not resolve an interpretive question that arises in the process of administering the statute,
Congress has created the need for some other institution to resolve a policy dispute" and
assigned that task to administrative agencies).
109. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (citing Sunstein, supra

note 25, at 2085-88); see also Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 866 (1984) ("[Fiederal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do."); Silberman, supra note 105, at 823
("[Whoever interprets the statute will often have room to choose between two or more plausible

interpretations. That sort of choice implicates and sometimes squarely involves policy making.
The agencies-even the independent ones-have superior political standing to the life-tenured
federal judiciary in performing that policy making function.").
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in defining the specific details of... policy when pressed to do so by
financially disappointed litigants." 110 In the Medicaid context, courts
have generally appreciated this point, refusing to "engage in an independent assessment of what rates [they] believe would be reasonable
and adequate," but instead applying an arbitrary and capricious-in
other words, a deferential-standard."'
3. Gap-Filling
Chevron's admonition that the courts must respect -agency
interpretations in filling "any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress"" 2 reflects not only an assessment of the expertise of the
agency, but also its breadth of vision in administering a complex
statutory program. Although courts can and do adhere to the principle that a statutory provision must be interpreted in light of the
entire statute,"3 an expert agency--even a state one-is better situated to address the interstices and gaps in a statutory scheme with
which it is charged with administering. For this reason, courts have
explained that Chevron deference is "even more appropriate" where "a
small corner of a labyrinthine statute" is at issue."1 For cooperative
federalism statutes like the Telecom Act, leaving these gaps for state
agencies to fill is appropriate for an additional rationale.
As
discussed in Part IV.B below, the very purpose of delegating decisionmaking authority to state agencies is to allow states to tailor approaches to suit their needs and conditions as well as to compete with
other states by experimenting with alternative methods that are not
inconsistent with the federal statutory scheme.

110. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Role of Judicial Review Regarding Medicare and Medicaid
Program Policy: Past Experience and Future Expectations, 35 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 759, 791-92
(1991).
111. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 24 (3d Cir. 1989). Other courts have
explained that with respect to the Medicaid Aces "reasonable and adequate" standard,
"[r]easonableness has been characterized as a zone, not a pinpoint." Colorado Health Care Ass'n
v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 842 F.2d 1158, 1167 (10th Cir. 1988). In relevant part, the
statutory standard provided by the Medicaid Act called for states to find that a reimbursement
plan is "reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and
economically operated facilities in order to provide care and services."
42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(13)(A) (1994), amended by Pub. L. 105-33, § 4732(a)(2), 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
112. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
113. See, e.g., Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Ass'n v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d
90, 94 (2d Cir. 1995) ('An individual section of a statute should not be interpreted in isolation
but as part of the entire statutory scheme.").
114. Skandalis v. Rowe, 14 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1994).
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B. Interstate Competition

Traditionally, cooperative federalism programs have served
four basic purposes. 1 5 First, they respect long-standing state interests and autonomy. 116 Second, they facilitate local participation and
greater accountability."17 Third, they allow for local experimentation
and interstate competition where appropriate.11 8 Finally, they rely on
the economy of local agencies (rather than creating or expanding a
new national bureaucracy)." 9
Cooperative federalism programs-like the Telecom Act-allow
for state involvement while guarding against deviation from basic
federal standards. Such schemes institute national rules that are
necessary to give rise to substantial efficiencies, 2 0 protect critical
equity concerns,1 21 safeguard against interjurisdictional externalities
115. Although I view the four criteria listed above as the essential characteristics of a
cooperative federalism program, other commentators have highlighted different ones. See, e.g.,
Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV.
1516, 1534 (1995) (stating that criteria include providing for state implementation, setting clear
standards, respecting state autonomy, providing mechanisms to police the democratic process,
and applying the same rules to government and private parties); Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clauseand State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
10 (1988) (emphasizing the characteristics of checking abuse of power, encouraging citizen
participation, creating diverse cultural and political environments, and encouraging innovation).
116. See Evan R Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement FederalLaw, 95 COLUM. I REV. 1001, 1006, 1014-15 (1995) (arguing that
states generally remain "autonomous decisionmaking units with self-elected officials and thus enjoy a
political existence separate from the central authorityW); Dwyer, supranote 8, at 1197-1208 (describing
how environmental laws are structured to allow some measure of state autonomous decision making).
117. See Dwyer, supra note 8, at 1185 n.10, 1198 (explaining that the structure of the
environmental regulatory regime facilitates state participation); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. RFV. 1059, 1067-74 (1980) (arguing that local governance facilitates
greater opportunities for political participation). For a thorough and recent review of the
literature hailing the possibilities for civic participation in decentralized regulatory regimes, see
Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine:
BalancingPoliticalParticipationand Economic Efficiency in RegulatoryFederalism, 75 TX. L.
REV. 1203, 1232 (1997) (stating that "political participation is likely to increase as policy
responsibilities are decentralized to state and local governments").
118. See Dwyer, supra note 8, at 1218 (noting that in the environmental context, federal
legislation has proved to be "a springboard for innovative regulation that goes beyond the
federal minimum, thereby giving life to Brandeis' description of the states as laboratories of
experimentation in public policy" and creating a system of cooperative federalism).
119. See Caminker, supra note 116, at 1014.
120. Such efficiencies might include, for example, the value of a national standard that
would be clearly superior to other alternatives or would create overwhelming economies of scale,
such as the ability of nationwide companies to plan on a national scale. Such efficiencies must
be both substantial and real, however, for there is also a substantial and real cost (e.g., loss of
experimentation and creativity in structuring regulatory schemes) in removing issues from the
purview of state agencies.
121. See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 83 (1981) (arguing that equity issues cannot be
effectively addressed through a competitive federalism model); cf. Robert W. Adler, Unfunded
Mandates and FiscalFederalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1252-53 (1997) (noting
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(for example, spillovers, such as pollution that crosses state lines),22
or prevent a "race to the bottom" between states. 23 At the same time,
cooperative federalism regimes allow individual states to tailor solutions to their particular needs and desires where it is appropriate to
do so. These features make cooperative federalism programs akin to
a model of limited competitive federalism. As articulated in the
Tiebout hypothesis, the pure model of competitive federalism calls for
each state to provide the best services that it can so as to lure businesses and residents.124 Under the cooperative federalism model,

that equity concerns, such as ensuring the protection of poorer citizens, can warrant the
institution of a uniform federal standard, though the guaranteed levels of public rights, goods,
and services can still be implemented in a flexible manner).
122. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth
Amendment. On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355,
1389-96 (1993) (using economic analysis to model this argument); see also Richard A. Epstein,
Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 153 (1992) ("The problem of
environmental spillovers across states is therefore one that the exit right cannot address.");
Pierce, supranote 6, at 670 ("It is in the national interest to permit each state to adopt its own
regulatory policy to the extent that such decisions affect only, or predominantly, the interests of
state residents. States should not be permitted, however, to make regulatory decisions that
create substantial interstate spillovers.").
123. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalismand the Corporation: The DesirableLimits on
State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV.L. REV. 1435, 1440 (1992) (arguing that certain
areas of corporate law produce a "race to the bottom" between states who would benefit from
uniform federal rules); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
MandatingState Implementation of NationalEnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212-16
(1977); Alan N. Greenspan, Note, The Constitutional Exercise of the FederalPolice Power: A
FunctionalApproach to Federalism,41 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1047-48 (1988) (arguing that use of
federal police power is appropriate when competition among the states forces them to the lowest
common denominator of regulation, and to neglect "the welfare, safety, or morality" of their
citizens). Some commentators have linked the interjurisdictional spillover issue with the race
to the bottom phenomenon, but others have identified them as distinct justifications. Compare
Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 117, at 1244-45 (stating that when interjurisdictional spillovers or
externalities "are present, state and local governments underprovide regulations with valuable,
positive spillovers (for example, air quality control) and overprovide regulations with harmful, negative
spillovers (for example, anticompetitive business regulations).... [In such instances] economic
competition no longer guarantees efficiency, more likely, competition becomes a 'race to the bottom. "),
with Richard L Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstateCompetition: Rethinking the Race.To-The-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 1210, 1212 (1992) (noting that
jurisdictional spiltovers provide a valid warrant for federal limits on state action, but questioning the
race to the bottom justification).
124. See Charles K. Tiebeut, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956). A more recent general articulation of these principles can be found in ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOIcE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
STATES (2d ed. 1978); see also Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine,91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 509 (1991) ("TIThe
community must compete with other jurisdictions if it wants to encourage development because
a developer dissatisfied with a community's exactions policy can take the project to another
jurisdiction that offers better terms."). Of more recent vintage, law and economics scholars have
celebrated the importance of competition between states and localities as a means for producing
better public policies. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism,26
J.L. & ECON. 23, 33-35 (1983).
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certain choices are removed from the state level to ensure that the
state does not compromise-for whatever reason-on issues of national importance. 25 Thus, cooperative federalism schemes define the
terms of competition between states so that they do not deviate from
basic federal policy goals, underinvest in goods and services that
would benefit neighboring states, or engage in a "race to the bottom."
The underlying vision of cooperative federalism is that state
agencies will compete with each other by implementing statutes like
the Telecom Act in a manner that each believes will best facilitate
economic development in its respective state. 126 In so doing, they will
continue to serve as "laboratories of democracy."127 When it passed
125. See THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 189
(1990) ("Just as various 'market failures'-externalities, monopolies, immobilities, and imperfect
information-reduce the efficiency of the competitive market model, so also do various imperfections limit the utility of the competitive federalism model."); Dwyer, supra note 8,at 1193
("Congress reserved an important role for the states in implementing and enforcing the federal
program, [but] excluded the states from certain policy decisions and programs where it suspected that the states would undermine federal goals"); Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid,
Introduction to COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND
EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1, 4 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991)
("[Flederal policies form a framework within which state and local governments compete.");
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On Federalism and Economic Development, 83 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1589
(1997) ("[Clooperative federalism [views] the primary function of the central government [as] encourag[ing] and enforc[ing] interjurisdictional contracts, which provide pure public goods
and... correct[ing] the failings of lower-tier fiscal competition.").
126. See Paul Teske & Mallika Bhattacharya, State Government Actors Beyond the
Regulators, in AMERICAN REGULATORY FEDERALISM & TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE
47, 50 (Paul Teske ed., 1995) [hereinafter AMERICAN REGULATORY FEDERALISM] ('[l]n the
multistate competition for jobs, each state faces prisoner's dilemma incentives that can force
them to compete even if they do not see a link, because competitor states are taking such
actions."); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the
Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 448-49 (1997) (noting that the quality of infrastructure
(e.g., telecommunications) is one of the resources states rely on in competing with each other for
firms); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1498 (1987) ("A consolidated national government has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it
stifles choice and lacks the goad of competition."); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and
Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 132 (1997) ("In short,
competitive federalism forces governments to be more efficient by improving services, reducing
costs, and better assessing citizen preferences for public goods.").
127. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Dwyer, supra note 8,at 1185 n.10. Kathleen Walman, a former Chief of the Common Carrier
Bureau at the Federal Communications Commission, made this very point more recently: "The
states have been marvelous laboratories; we [in Washington] have a lot to learn from the
states." Kathleen MH.Wallman, Keynote Address: The State Role in Telecommunications
Regulation, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 7, 18 (1996) (footnote omitted); see also Barry Cole, State
Policy Laboratories,in AMERICAN REGULATORY FEDERALISM, supra note 126, at 44-45 ("States
have acted as policy laboratories in the decade since the breakup of AT&T.... [S]ome [states]
have already acted as models not only for other states, but for the federal government."); Paul
Teske, Conclusions, in AMERICAN REGULATORY FEDERALISM, supra note 126, at 141 (There is
"much evidence that states are playing an experimental, laboratory role in a period of
substantial technological economic and financial uncertainty in this dynamic industry."). There
is also good reason to believe that experimentation in environmental policy has had the desired
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the Telecom Act, Congress recognized that a number of states had
experimented with different forms of telecommunications regulation,
and it preserved state flexibility to continue to do so in ways that are
not inconsistent with the terms of the Act. s To best serve Congress'
appreciation for the value of state experimentation and innovation,
courts should defer to the decisions of state agencies so that the
nation can benefit from the hallmark flexibility of cooperative
19
federalism programs.
Although a uniform approach to telecommunications regulation makes sense where there is a clearly superior policy approach,
Congress or the FCC, and not the courts, should decide when a particular approach is the optimal one. Where there is an optimal policy,
but Congress or the FCC does not mandate it, it is reasonable to expect that the vast majority of states-through the process of regulatory competition-will eventually adopt such an approach. 10
Conversely, where no policy is clearly superior, it will be beneficial to
allow different states to experiment by testing different approaches.' 3 '

effect. See, e.g., David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's Time for a New Look to Our
"LaboratoriesofDemocracy"in the Effort to Improve our Approach to Environmental Regulation,
58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 353-55 (1994) (explaining that actors from both sides of the environmental
debate believe states, not the federal government, are creating the most innovative regulatory
regimes).
128. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(3) (West Supp. 1998).
129. See Deel v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1079, 1083 (4th Cir. 1988) ([Sjtate flexibility allows the
development of specifically tailored solutions to specific problems, and provides fifty state
proving grounds in which the efficacy of administrative innovations can be tested. This reality
in turn underlies the Courts admonition that state rules are not to be lightly displaced."); cf
New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (holding that courts
should not "presume... that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the
power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intent to do so."). Along these lines,
President Clinton recently stressed that he endorsed the cooperative federalism approach in
order to facilitate valuable experimentation by the states. See Gary Wills, The War Between the
States and Washington, N.Y. TIMEs, July 5, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 28 (quoting President
Clinton: "What my Administration tried to do was, basically, to emphasize two things-No. 1,
states as laboratories of democracy, principally in education, health care and welfare reform;
and secondly, actually reduce the aggregate volume of regulations in areas where I thought
there was too much micromanagement").
130. See Raymond W. Lawton & Bob Burns, Models of Cooperative Federalism for
Telecommunications, 6 ALB. L.J. Scl. & TEcH. 71, 86 (1996) ('Generally, no state can afford to
design or justify (based on evidence submitted in public hearings) a set of energy policies that
are arbitrarily different from the policies of adjacent states, or its region. This incentive
encourages an appropriate level of uniformity.").
131. Mary Loring Lyndon recently made a similar point regarding when federal courts
should preempt state tort remedies:
Whether it is best to preempt [is] a matter of maximizing incentives and opportunities to
research. In this approach, uniformity and singular control may be appropriate ways to
manage some risks, but not others. Where we are unsure [about the merits of a
particular approach], the learning model of the law suggests that values other than
uniformity may be primary.
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If federal courts refuse to accord state agencies deference in
implementing federal law, then states may be pushed to rely on independent state authority-as preserved by many cooperative federalism schemes like the Telecom Act-to adopt different approaches than
those mandated by the reviewing federal courts. 1 2 If state agencies
are forced to take this approach, the federal courts would in effect
have to examine the same issues in two separate contexts, first to
decide what the Act requiresin interconnection agreements and then
to determine what states are allowed to do to supplement those
1
requirements. 33
Although this outcome would involve duplicative
litigation and delay, at least it would still allow the states to engage
in some of the experimentation contemplated by the Act. A worse fate
than this unnecessary litigation would be a situation in which the
states, in the face of intrusive federal court oversight of their decisions in the interconnection agreement context, declined to rely on
their own authority at all and simply accepted the decision of the
reviewing courts on what approach federal law required. In this
event, the states would be abdicating their responsibility to experiment in telecommunications regulation and consequently would deprive American consumers of the benefits of a competitive federalism.' 34

Mary Loring Lyndon, Tort Law, Preemptionand Risk Management, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 69,
80(1997).
132. This effect might be particularly acute if certain state agency rulemakings were

reviewed in state court where they almost certainly would be accorded deference. See, e.g.,
Indiana State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Tioga Pines Living Ctr., Inc., 622 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ind.
1993) (applying deferential treatment to state agency interpretation of state Medicaid plan);
Madrid Home for the Aging v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 557 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Iowa 1996)

(explaining the broad scope of state decision-making authority within the Medicaid program);
Americare Properties, Inc. v. Whiteman, 891 P.2d 336, 344 (Kan. 1995) (adopting an aribitrary

and capricious standard for reviewing state Medicaid agency's decisions); Home Care Ass'n v.
Bane, 643 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (same); St. Francis Extended Health Care v.

Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 801 P.2d 212, 215 (Wash. 1990) (explaining that Congress
granted states flexibility in administering the Medicaid program and thus review of state
agency decisions should be deferential).
133. State agencies are likely to be given considerable latitude in imposing supplemental

requirements, as the Supremacy Clause does not call for preemption of state regulation unless
"Congress has explicitly preempted the particular form of state regulation at issue or it is
literally impossible for a regulatee to comply with federal and state requirements." Pierce,
supra note 6, at 644. As to the latter, supplemental requirements are by definition ones with
which regulatees can comply; as to the former, the Telecom Act not only does not preempt state
authority to facilitate the transition to competitive telecommunications markets, it affirmatively
preserves state authority in the area. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(dX3) (West Supp. 1998).
134. Cf West Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying a non-

deferential standard and thereby requiring all states to pursue a single approach "would run
counter to the congressional intent that states be afforded considerable freedom in pursuing
ways of limiting [Miedicaid costs and encouraging efficiency").
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C. The Competence of State Agencies
Applying Chevron to cooperative federalism schemes also recognizes that the congressional scheme places state agencies on a level
with federal ones. Consistent with the dictum from Hunter's Lessee,
however, the federal courts have refused to accord this recognition to
state agencies, explaining that they lack "the expertise in
implementing federal laws and policies and the nationwide
perspective of a federal agency." 115 Obviously, state agencies lack the
nationwide perspective of a federal agency, but the relevant inquiry is
why should that matter? In the case of cooperative federalism
statutes like the Telecom Act, state agencies enjoy the confidence of
Congress (who delegated to them the opportunity to implement
federal law), possess the necessary expertise in the subject matter
(which is more important than expertise in implementing federal laws
per se), and are well situated to fill in the gaps in complex regulatory
statutes.
Understood in a different light, the argument against state
agency competence is not that they lack expertise as such, but rather
that they would pursue parochial interests over the national interest.
This concern, however, fails to appreciate the very nature of cooperative federalism schemes. By designing a statutory scheme that assigns important interpretive authority to state agencies, Congress
recognizes the value of tailoring federal regulation to local conditions
as well as the value of experimenting with different approaches.
Where Congress desires a national solution in a cooperative federalism statute, it either decides for itself what course to take or delegates unconstrained authority to a federal agency to determine the
areas Where a national solution is appropriate. Thus, the very point
of cooperative federalism schemes-and the argument for deference to
state agencies-is to allow states to adopt the approach that they
deem to be the optimal regulatory strategy (even if it is a "parochial"
one) whenever the statutory scheme authorizes them to make that
decision in the first instance.
Underlying the concerns about parochialism and the lack of a
nationwide perspective appears to be a concern that state agencies
are more vulnerable to capture than federal ones. Due to the competitive dynamics of cooperative federalism schemes, however, this
concern should be somewhat diminished by a state's political process
(which should respond to the threat that companies and citizens will
135. Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312,316 (9th Cir. 1988).
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opt for those states with suiperior economic development strategies).
More fundamentally, cooperative federalism statutes often include
institutional protections against state agency capture. The Telecom
Act, for example, addresses certain key issues by resolving them as a
matter of statutory text or by delegating them to the FCC. In
addition, even where the Act authorizes the state agencies to make
certain decisions, the FCC's responsibility for evaluating the
applications of the Bell Companies for in-region long distance
authority provides an important check that will help ensure that the
136
local market-opening job is completed in a satisfactory manner.
Finally, the Act's judicial review provisions provide a proceduralist
check--even with a deferential review of substantive decisions-that
will help to ensure that the state agencies undertake a reasoned
consideration of the issues presented to them. 187 In the Medicaid Act
context, this requirement has imposed real demands on state
agencies, requiring them to "conduct an objective analysis, evaluation,
or some type of fact-finding process."8
136. In a decision subsequent to Iowa Utilities Board, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the
FCC could not examine pricing decisions at all in the context of reviewing a Bell Company
application for section 271 authority. See Iowa Util Bd. v. FCC, 135 F.3d 535, 543 (8th Cir.
1998), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3623 (Mar. 13, 1998) (No. 97-1519). In addition to the
jurisdictional objections to this ruling (section 271 appeals are only to be heard in the D.C.
Circuit), the substance of this decision limited FCC authority in an area where it faces no
section 2(b) limitation-considering Bell Company entry into the interstate long distance
market. Moreover, the decision also might well have precluded the FCC from giving effect-let
alone the substantial weight required by the Act--to the Justice Department's competitive
assessment of the merits of Bell Company entry insofar as the Department's assessment
examines the pricing structure of the state at issue. See id. at 541 (precluding any examination
of pricing under either the competitive checklist or the public interest test). Because the
Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit on the FCC's authority to institute pricing
guidelines, the basis for the Eighth Circuit's section 271 ruling no longer exists. In any event, it
is still possible that the FCC's role in implementing section 271 could serve the purpose
discussed above-that is, the FCC could decline to prescribe regulations under section 251, but
rely on its section 271 authority as a backstop to oversee a state agency's implementation of the
Act.
137. See Americare Properties, 891 P.2d at 343 (citing cases holding that the weight of
authority governing Medicaid Act challenges to state agency decisions calls for de novo review of
compliance with the Act's procedural requirements); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter
the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 469 (1987) (asserting that the reasoned decisions requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act standard can "flush out" illegitimate decisions).
For a good explanation of the value of a standard of judicial review that allows state agencies to
experiment substantively, provided that they undertake a careful process of considering the
various alternatives, see Dorf & Sabel, supra note 89, at 392 (arguing that the proper scope of
judicial review of state agency action is a careful examination of its procedure that "avoids the
extremes of deference and intrusion").
138. Americare Properties,891 P.2d at 345. As for the procedural requirements, a state is
not required to adopt any specific approach, but "the requirement to make findings is real:
'mere recitation of the wording of the federal statute is not sufficient for procedural
compliance." Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. and Rehabilitation Servs., 31
F.3d 1536, 1539 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
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D. HistoricalSupport for DeferentialReview: The Ratemaking Cases
Federal judicial review of state agency action under the
Telecom Act closely resembles the judicial review of utility
ratemaking decisions, although the institutional actors are different
in the two models. 13 9 Under the classic model, state public utility
commissions were charged with regulating the retail rates charged by
utilities under their jurisdiction, subject to judicial review based upon
takings limitations. The new model instituted by the Telecom Act
charges those same public utility commissions with developing-through
arbitration-interconnection agreements between the incumbent
providers and the new entrants. These agreements, which specify the
terms and conditions of entry into the local telephone market, are then
subject to review in federal court to ensure consistency with the terms of
the Telecom Act and FCC regulations.
Although the federal courts have little experience with reviewing the interconnection agreements spurred by the Telecom Act, they
have considerable experience in takings review of ratemaking orders.
As the litigation over the terms specified in the interconnection
agreements will focus, at least in considerable part, on the cost of
transactions between incumbent providers and new entrants, there
are important analogies between the "old world" and "new world"
ratemaking litigation. Indeed, as noted above in Part III (and
discussed below in Part V), federal courts reviewing state agency
decisions implementing the Telecom Act will be asked to evaluate
some basic ratemaking issues like how to determine the proper
methodology for pricing unbundled network elements.
In considering whether to adopt an intrusive or a deferential
review of state agency decisions, federal courts would do well to
reflect upon the failed and abandoned effort to employ a more
intrusive review standard of state ratemaking orders under the
Takings Clause. Justice Brandeis became an early critic of the
intrusive standard adopted in Smyth v. Ames, lamenting that it set
out "the laborious and baffling task of finding the present value of the
utility.140 Eventually, in the Hope NaturalGas decision, the Supreme
879 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 1989)); see also Madrid Home for the Aging v. Iowa Dep't of Human
Servs., 557 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Iowa 1996) (procedural "requirement is not a mere formality").
139. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral. The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2119 (1997) ("[Tlhe system of forced interaction follows in the pattern
of earlier common carrier regulation to place complex substantive and institutional limitations
on the power of any person simply to take the property of another.").
140. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 292
(1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Court rejected the laborious model of judicial review called for by
Smyth and adopted a more deferential review of state ratemaking
decisions.' 4 ' In essence, the new approach resembles "something akin
to Chevron deference," 42 instructing courts to leave ratemaking
decisions to regulators unless the decisions deviate from a "zone of
reasonableness."'4 Thus, it is no accident that the D.C. Circuit's
articulation of why courts should review ratemaking decisions
deferentially mirrors the exact lesson taught by Chevron: "Issues of
rate design are fairly technical and, insofar as they are not technical,
involve policy judgments that lie at the core of the regulatory mission.
Not surprisingly, therefore, our review is deferential."' 44
V. THE UNIFORMITY ISSUE
Even if courts conclude that Chevron and the historical experience of ratemaking review suggest that deference to state agencies
would be a sensible configuration of the "institutional roles of the
different players in the administrative state,"145 the resulting absence
141. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944). Richard
Pierce describes the Courts shift in Hope Natural Gas as a pragmatic one:
Prior to Hope, the Court's approach to review of ratemaking was formulaic; it focused in
meticulous detail on the method by which an agency calculated a rate, insisting in case
after case that government agency ratemaking reflect[s] the market value of a utility's
assets through application of a prescribed formula. The Hope Court formally abandoned
this insistence upon specific methodology in favor of what purported to be a purely
pragmatic test.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the JudiciaryAttempt to Police
the PoliticalInstitutions,77 GEO. L.J. 2031,2032(1989).
142. Chen, supra note 68, at 79.
143. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968) (MAlnyrate selected... from the
broad zone of reasonableness ... cannot properly be attacked as confiscatory."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
The Role of Constitutionaland Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TML L REV. 469, 478-79
(1985) ([Ajgencies and courts realized that no prescribed formula produced acceptable results in all
contexts and that iust and reasonable' had no fixed meaning. As a result, they replaced the formulaic
approach with ... a 'zone of reasonableness' [approach] within which any rate... must be airmed.")
(footnote omitted); see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989) ("e economic
judgments required in rate proceedings ...do not admit of a single correct result. The Constitution is
not designed to arbitrate these economic niceties. Errors to the detriment of one party may well be
canceled out by countervailing errors or allowances in another part of the rate proceeding.").
144. Town of Norwood v. FERC, 962 F.2d 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1992). State courts also tend to
give expert agencies considerable deference in ratemaking. See, e.g., U.S. W. Communications,
Inc. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 1321, 1328 (Wash. 1997) (stating that
courts should allow "regulatory agencies [to] exercise substantial discretion in selecting the
appropriate rate making methodology").
145. Herz, supra note 27, at 187; see also Pierce, supra note 108, at 2227 (noting that
"Chevron.. . set forth, for the first time, a coherent analytical framework that anchors the
modem administrative state securely within the boundaries" of the Constitution's separation of
powers principles).
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of uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law is
likely to give them considerable pause. Indeed, in other areas of the
law, such as preemption, "a common judicial impulse... has been to
strive for 'uniformity.'"146 Before concluding that a concern for uniformity should trump the values of Chevron policy and cooperative
federalism, federal courts should remember that the principle that
"federal statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide
application 147 is a canon of construction, not a categorical command. 1 By elevating this principle above Chevron policy and the
values of experimentation and interstate competition, courts reject
the possibility that there are advantages to a lack of uniformity in
federal law. 149 Moreover, even where uniformity in the interpretation
of certain statutory gaps or ambiguities may be desirable, it is not
likely to be readily achievable through judicial review. Thus, for both
principled and practical reasons, federal courts should accept a certain amount of diversity in cooperative federalism programs.
A. The Value of Diversity
Although the ability to generate uniform interpretations and
applications of federal law may be uniquely within the province of
federal agencies, the very nature of cooperative federalism schemes
leaves certain aspects to the respective state agencies to implement in
a flexible and varied manner. 15 0 In the case of the Telecom Act, a provision that preserves state authority to facilitate the transition to
competitive telecommunications markets makes it plain that the Act
151
allows for, and indeed encourages, such experimentation.

146. Lyndon, supra note 131, at 75.
147. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,43 (1989).
148. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-FederalistView of Article HI: Separatingthe Two Tiers
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 220 m59 (1985) ("It is not at all clear that

uniformity is a value inherent in the constitutional structure.").
149. Unfortunately, the argument that national uniformity in regulation is desirable is

often accepted by courts as a self-evident truth, without a careful analysis of when uniformity is
actually valuable and necessary. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of
FRTSA Preemption?:A CaseStudy of the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ONLEGIS. 35, 68-69 (1996)
(stating that the notion that "national uniformity equals regulatory efficiency" is both an "unexamined
and perhaps erroneous" assumption).

150. See Moulton, supra note 126, at 77-78 ("Not only is a lack of uniformity inevitable in a
federal system, it is one of the principal goals of federalism. As a matter of history, politics,
economics, and culture, the fundamental role of states in the federal system is to permit diversity of normative choices.").
§ 251(dX3) (West Supp. 1998). Indeed, the Act's commitment to state
151. See 47 U.S.C.
authority, and its intention not to preempt state regulation that is consistent with its terms,
suggests that it does not place a high premium on uniform regulation across the nation. See
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Despite the rhetorical force of the call for uniformity and the
canon that federal law is generally to be applied uniformly, a number
of federal schemes allow and indeed call for diverse results in different states. In federal maritime law, for example, the Supreme Court
has often noted that the states are left with a "wide scope" to address
matters as they choose, so long as they do not "make inroads on a
harmonious system."15 2 In Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, the
Supreme Court recently applied this principle, concluding that federal
maritime law did not require a single approach to wrongful death
remedies. 153 Citing uniformity concerns, the defendants in Yamaha
Motor argued that the administration of maritime law demanded a
single national approach to what remedies were available for federal
maritime wrongful death claims. 54 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, making clear that maritime law-though federal in natore-is not a "solitary" scheme and did not demand "uniform adherence to a federal rule of decision, with no leeway for variation or
supplementation by state law."155 In so doing, the Court pointed out
that a relevant congressional statute expressly affirmed state authority in the area and ultimately concluded that the purposes of maritime law would best be served by leaving the states with room to
experiment with different remedies, provided that they were compatible with the federal scheme. 15 6
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 815-16 (1985) (noting that preemption of
state regulation, and not federal review, is the quintessential means for ensuring uniformity).
152. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 211 n.8 (1996) ("The federal cast of
admiralty law, we have observed, means that 'state law must yield to the needs of a uniform
federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious system[,] [b]ut this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope.'") (quoting Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959)); see also Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 40
F.3d 622, 628 (3d Cir. 1994) (State law may be applied in admiralty cases unless it conflicts with
federal law by "prejudic[ing] the 'characteristic features' of federal maritime law, or interfer[ing]
with the 'proper harmony and uniformity of that law.'") (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)), affd, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
153. Yamaha Motor, 516 U.S. at 200-01. A number of other federal schemes provide only a
right of action and define the scope of the duty while leaving other important features up to
state law. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (concluding that state law
provides the statute of limitations for civil rights laws); Tipton v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 141, 148 (1936) (finding that Federal Safety Appliance Act leaves remedy up to
state law).
154. Yamaha Motor, 516 U.S. at 209-210.
155. Id. at 210.
156. See id. at 216. The Yamaha Motor Courtfs appreciation for experimentation and
diversity diverged from what some had thought to be the core principle of maritime law: the
need for national uniformity. See, e.g., Steven R. Swanson, Federalism,the Admiralty, and Oil
Spills, 27 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 379, 380-81 (1996) ("The goal of maritime law is to create an efficiently functioning set of rules that is uniform and predictable.... This need for uniformity was
the motivating force behind the maritime grant in the Constitution.").; B.J. Haeck, Note,
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun: An Examination of Jurisdiction,Choice-of-Laws, and Federal
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The Supreme Court's decision not to preempt diverse remedial
schemes in Yamaha Motor suggests that federal courts should be
hesitant to displace differing state approaches to telecommunications
deregulation under the Telecom Act based upon the mere invocation
of the uniformity argument. To be sure, the form of deference in
Yamaha Motor differs from that in the implementation of the Telecom
Act. An admiralty court tolerates various state remedial schemes by
forebearing from federal common lawmaking, whereas deference to
the state agencies implementing the Telecom Act tolerates different
approaches by accepting any reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous federal statutory term.
But the end result is
fundamentally similar. In both cases, federal courts refrain from
ousting state decisions by recognizing the value of state
experimentation that is compatible with the fundamental precepts of
a federal regulatory scheme.
In charging state agencies with the implementation of federal
law, Congress (or the federal agency if it enjoys residual authority)
decides that the resolution of certain issues will benefit from
differentiation, flexibility, and particularized knowledge. 157 In these
situations, a state agency will often be just as capable as its federal
counterpart in its ability to (1) "identify, obtain, and evaluate relevant
data and analysis"; (2) "operate[] as a mechanism to register
preferences for collective goods"; and (3) "coordinate regulatory decisions that courts deal with in isolation."158 Thus, before federal courts

displace state agency decisions and sacrifice the benefits of cooperative federalism on uniformity grounds, they should consider the words
of Justice Jackson in an eloquent dissent from a Supreme Court deci-

Interests in Maritime Law, 72 WASH. L. REV. 181, 202 (1997) ("Because the U.S. Supreme Court
had emphasized uniformity again and again in its prior decisions in maritime .tort, the lower
courts understandably came to accept this as a motivating factor in their decisions."). The view
that federal common law schemes necessarily demand uniformity has always been based more
on rhetoric than reality, however. For example, with respect to customary international
law-an area of federal common lawmaking that has continued, though under increasing
criticism, in the wake of Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)--states could, and
sometimes did, depart from federal court understandings of the content of [customary
international law]."
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the
Incorporationof InternationalLaw, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2263 (1998); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrED STATES, §§ 111-15 introductory note at
41 (1987) ("State and federal courts respectively determined international law for themselves as
they did common law, and questions of international law could be determined differently by the
courts of the various States and by the federal courts.").
157. See Caminker, supra note 116, at 1006, 1013-14; Dwyer, supra note 8, at 1192-93.
158. Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity
Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1565 n.101 (1983).
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sion that displaced state regulation of utilities through a broad construction of the Federal Power Act:
Congress may well have believed that diversity of experimentation in the field
of regulation has values which centralization and uniformity destroy.... Long
before the Federal Government could be stirred to regulate utilities, courageous states took the initiative and almost the whole body of utility practice
has resulted from their experiences.... It must be remembered that closer
than any federal agency to those they regulate and to their customers are the
state authorities, whose mechanisms are less cumbersome and whose principles can much more quickly be adjusted to the changing times. We should not
utilize the centralizing powers of the federal judiciary to destroy diversities between states which Congress has been scrupulous to protect. If now and then
some state does not regulate its utilities according to the federal standard, it
may be a small price to pay for preserving the state initiative which gave us
utilities regulation far in advance of federal initiative. 5 9

The values behind deference to state agencies in the implementation of cooperative federalism regulatory statutes bears considerable similarity to the values underpinning the abstention doctrines
that call for federal judicial deference to state judicial or
administrative proceedings. Like these doctrines, applying Chevron
to cooperative federalism schemes enables federal courts both to
respect the federalism interests recognized by Congress in delegating
power to state agencies, as well as to avoid addressing issues in which
the state agencies admittedly enjoy superior expertise. 160 Although
the rhetorical appeal of uniformity in federal law enjoys a legacy
dating back to Hunter's Lessee, it is also directly contradicted by longstanding judicial practice.
As David Shapiro has convincingly
159. Federal Power Comm'n v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464,488-89 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
160. Along these same lines, one commentator has argued that Chevron can best be understood as a protective doctrine that enables the judiciary to screen out certain disputes that it
cannot satisfactorily or effectively resolve. See Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal CourtsDefer
to Agency Interpretation of Statutes? A New DoctrinalBasis for Chevron U.SA v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1299 ("Chevron is best understood as
stating a judicially self-imposed deference requirement which is analogous to the various
prudential justiciability-based limitations on federal court jurisdiction."). Indeed, judicial
abstention doctrines, like the Chevron doctrine, instruct courts to respect specialized decision
makers addressing complex regulatory matters. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 360-61 (1989) (noting that abstention was appropriate in both
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), and Alabama Public Service Commission v.
Southern RailroadCo., 341 U.S. 341 (1951), because state court review in those cases involved
specialized decision makers addressing complex regulatory matters). Alternatively, Chevron
deference can be analogized to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which calls for judicial
deference (in the form of a referral to an expert agency) whenever "enforcement of the claim
requires the regulation of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body." Goya Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 846
F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1988).
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explained, the common law tradition firmly authorizes courts to use
their equitable discretion in deciding whether to decide matters
within their jurisdiction. 161 In choosing how to review state agency
interpretations of cooperative federalism statutes, the federal courts
would do well to utilize this discretion by adopting the Chevron
standard in order to keep themselves out of areas where they are at a
relative disadvantage.

162

Even if the federal courts conclude that uniformity concerns
are paramount in interpreting cooperative federalism statutes, they
should bear in mind that they are not well suited to develop uniform
rules on intricate regulatory matters in any event. For example, the
details of the Telecom Act are likely to generate considerable conflict
among the courts of appeal (not to mention the district courts), and it
is pure fiction to envision Supreme Court review of them all. 163 In

short, if a certain lack of uniformity is inevitable and even tolerable-as several commentators suggest'6--then courts might ask
themselves what uniformity purposes are actually served by a more
intrusive standard of review.
B. The Inability to Generate Uniformity Through JudicialReview:
The Case of the Telecom Act
Perhaps because of the lack of clarity on how certain provisions
of the Telecom Act should be interpreted (and by whom), the FCC
took the position that the Act authorized it to cabin state agency decisions on all matters relating to the development of local competition,
161. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 588 (1985)
("[Tihe responsibility of the federal courts to adjudicate disputes does and should carry with it
significant leeway for the exercise of reasoned discretion in matters relating to federal jurisdiction.").
162. As some commentators have put it, the best judicial policy in certain areas is forbearance. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 141, at 2075 ("Electric utility ratemaking is only one of many
arenas, however, in which judicial forbearance ultimately will yield a political solution superior
to that available from the judiciary.").
163. Edward Hartnett recently emphasized this point, explaining that:
No system-short of requiring Supreme Court review of all state court judgments
involving federal issues-will produce perfect uniformity. Perfect uniformity would
require eliminating the choice now given to losing litigants to decline to seek review,
eliminating the discretion given to the Court to decline to exercise review, and
eliminating the restrictions on the Coures jurisdiction.
Edward Hartnett, Why is the Supreme Court of the United States ProtectingState Judges from
PopularDemocracy?, 75 Tmx L. REV. 907, 945 n.205 (1997).
164. See, e.g., id. ("[UIf an issue arises infrequently enough, some disuniformity may be
permanent, but, for precisely that reason, hardly of serious concern."); Arthur D. Hellman, By
Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved IntercircuitConflicts, 56 U. PITr. L.
REV. 693, 697 (1995) (concluding that "unresolved intercircuit conflicts do not constitute a
problem of serious magnitude in the federal judicial system").
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including the methodology used to calculate the rates at which competitors could lease individual elements unbundled from an incumbent provider's network. As discussed in Part III, the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Iowa Utilities Board rejected the FCC's claim to interpretive authority on this issue, holding that the Telecom Act left
decisions about intrastate telecommunications services not specifically assigned to the FCC solely in the hands of the state regulators.165
Had the Supreme Court not overturned that ruling, the federal courts
would not have been guided by any controlling authority when
reviewing state agency interpretations of federal law in a multitude of
situations. Even with the reinstatement of the FCC's regulations,
however, there are still likely to be a number of situations where the
state agencies will be left with discretion to interpret the Telecom Act
subject only to judicial review or the subsequent adoption of a
regulation by the FCC.166
The regulatory and judicial processes surrounding the development of interconnection agreements are designed to develop fair
arrangements between incumbent providers and new entrants. As
Congress rightly recognized, voluntary negotiation between the parties would not be sufficient to develop the necessary arrangements, as
"the blockade position of the local monopolists is such that they would
have every incentive to guard access to their networks against their
would-be competitors. "167 Because many of these arrangements-access
to unbundled network elements, porting of telephone numbers when
customers switch providers, access to rights-of-way, or terms and
conditions for exchanging traffic-will come at a price, considerable
incentives exist for parties to contest unfavorable results by arguing that
they stemmed from legal error. Under Chevron, however, review of these
arrangements would not invite judicial policymaking, but would instead
be limited to whether the expert agency adopted a reasonable
interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, followed the requisite

165. Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 794 n.10 (8th Cir. 1997) (listing areas of the
FCC's enumerated authority), rev'd in partand affd in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util.
Bd., No. 97-826, 1999 WL 24568 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1999).

166. As noted above, the lack of controlling authority on certain questions would still be a
dilemma for federal district courts even if the FCC's pricing rules remained in effect, as those
pricing rules would still confer considerable discretion on the state agencies. See FCC Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 26, 39, FCC v. Iowa Util. Bd., 135 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-831)

(explaining that state agencies are able to 'exercise considerable discretion" and serve the
"important task of tailoring [the Act's] standards to accommodate region-or carrier-specific

variables" even under the FCC's pricing regulations).
167. Epstein, supra note 139, at 2119.
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statutory procedures,168 and applied that interpretation in a reasonable
manner 69 Bearing these constraints in mind, Part V.B.1 below details
how district courts should review state agency decisions regarding the
"cost"-based pricing standard for unbundled network elements under
Chevron, and Part V.B.2 outlines the likely outcomes if federal courts
decline to follow this approach.
1. The "Cost"-Based Pricing Standard
In the wake of its defeat in Iowa Utilities Board, the FCC argued that a federal statutory term must have a single meaning nationwide and, even if that meaning cannot be determined by reference
to an FCC regulation, it still must be defined by a federal court.7 0
Many district courts appear to agree with this sentiment and have not
deferred to state agency interpretations of federal telecommunications
law on uniformity grounds.' 7 ' Under this approach, however, federal

courts reviewing state arbitrations will have the unwelcome task of
engaging in de novo review of the pricing methodology of state PUCs.
Moreover, even though the federal regulations on pricing are now
binding and provide guidance to the federal courts, judicial battles
over pricing will still ensue; the FCC's Local Competition Order sets

forth only broad guiding principles for states to consider in establishing forward-looking costs. 7 2 That is, even with the reinstatement of
the FCC regulations, federal courts will still be called upon to oversee
168. In the Medicaid Act context, for example, the weight of authority interprets Chevron
as calling for a de novo review of the procedural requirements (e.g., whether the agency made
the necessary findings), but a deferential standard on the interpretation of the Act's substantive
requirements. See, e.g., Americare Properties, Inc. v. Whiteman, 891 P.2d 336, 339-340 (Kan.
1995).
169. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 105 (1983) (stating that a court must review an agency decision to ensure "a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made"); Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas
Dep't of Soc. & Rehabilitation Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1540 (10th Cir. 1994) ("While states have
considerable discretion, their determination of reasonable reimbursement rates must be
principled.").
170. See FCC Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Iowa Util. Bd., 135 F.3d 535 (8th Cir.
1998) (No. 97-831) (arguing that the Act could not have given state commissions unbounded
discretion in calculating wholesale rate structure required as a matter of federal law); id. at 2224 (arguing that federal court review of the Act's basic legal issues, such as the proper cost
standard, will eventually yield a nationwide definition of key statutory terms).
17L See, e.g., U.S. W. Communications, Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., No. C97-222WD, 1998
WL 350588, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 7, 1998) ("Chevron deference is not appropriate where as
many as fifty state commissions will be applying the Telecommunications Act.").
172. See Rosston, supra note 48, at 8 ("It is impossible to predict actual rates in any state
from the principles set forth in the Order. In fact, some states are suing... because they think
the resulting rates will be too high, while others are suing because they think the.., rates will
be too low.").
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state interpretations of constraining principles (imposed by either the
Act itself or by FCC regulations) in order to establish the actual rates
for the leasing of unbundled network elements.
The most basic question about the statutory concept of "cost"based pricing for unbundled network elements is whether there will
be a single definition that will constrain how they can be priced. In
the absence of a binding FCC regulation after the Eighth Circuit's
decision, courts were forced to decide for themselves whether the
prices charged for unbundled network elements must be "forwardlooking" or based on "historic costs." 173 Based on the Act's purpose of
fostering competition, 174 the FCC regulations concluded that the Act
demands the former definition, but the issue is hardly free of
controversy. 75
With regard to the pricing of unbundled network elements, the
incentive for parties to seek a better deal from the courts than they
obtained from state regulators will be enormous. 76 It seems unlikely,
however, that courts will be in a position to recalculate the prices for
telecommunications facilities and services; as the Supreme Court has
candidly put it, "neither law nor economics has yet devised generally
173. A forward-looking cost methodology calls for a network to be leased at its efficient
replacement cost. That is, such a methodology asks what it would cost a competitor to build the
network today and not what amount was actually paid for the network when it was built.
174. The FCC's Local Competition Orderexplained that:
In dynamic competitive markets, firms take action based not on embedded costs, but on
the relationship between market-determined prices and forward-looking economic costs.
If market prices exceed forward-looking economic costs, new competitors will enter the
market. If their forward-looking economic costs exceed market prices, new competitors
will not enter the market and existing competitors may decide to leave.
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,813 (1996).
175. See Rosston, supra note 48, at 8 ("There was, and is, significant debate about the
pricing principles set forth by the Commission."). Compare Gregory J. Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network
Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1081, 1083 (1997)
(arguing that incumbent providers should be forced to lease network elements at their historic
cost), with William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1038
(1997) ("Most economists, joined by the FCC and the majority of state PUCs, believe that
rational decisions on the pricing of unbundled network elements and access to local networks
must be based on forward-looking costs."), and id. at 1062-63 ("For regulation to provide
consumers the benefits of competition, the regulatory rules must replicate the behavior in
competitive markets.... [C]ompetitive markets force firms to adapt their prices to forwardlooking costs.").
176. Joel I. Klein, The Race for Local Competition: A Long Distance Run, Not a Sprint,
Address Before the American Enterprise Institute 6 (Nov. 5, 1997), in Speeches by Senior
Members
of
the
Antitrust
Division
(last
modified
Mar.
10,
1998)
<httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1268.htm> (stating that incumbents and new
entrants are bound to fight over pricing, as it "can determine the relative success of the new
entrants vis-a-vis the existing incumbent monopolist," and "each side understandably wants a
margin of error to protect itself").
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accepted standards for the evaluation of rate-making orders." 77 In
short, because "agency ratemaking is far from an exact science and
involves policy determinations in which the agency is acknowledged to
have expertise," 17s it would not be "the most sensible" administrative

scheme to ask courts to engage in intrusive judicial review over those
decisions. 179 Indeed, if the past history of the judicial review of
ratemaking decisions is prologue, the courts would do well to accord
the state agencies deference in this area (even with respect to their
interpretation and implementation of the FCC regulations).180
Chevron deference does not mean that courts are to forsake
judicial review, but rather that judicial review should be premised on
modern administrative law principles as opposed to second-guessing
of reasonable agency determinations.' 8' As is always the case, the
amount of guidance that can be had from a statutory term through
the traditional tools of statutory interpretation is sure to be disputed, 82 but Chevron demands that courts determine what range of
choices are available to the agency under the statute. As with the
Medicaid Act, courts interpreting the Telecom Act may require that
state agency decisions hew not only to the procedural requirements
and the textual bounds of the Act, but also remain "consistent with
the objectives" of the Act.1 83 That is, rather than engaging in the
details of pricing methodologies for unbundled network elements,
courts can be far more effective by identifying pricing arrangements
that are outside the range of what any state commission could accept

177. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968).
178. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert
denied, 516 U.S. 1112 (1996).
179. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 2086.
180. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Prod. S.E. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 224
(1991) ("Far from binding [FERCI, the Just and reasonable' requirement [of the Natural Gas
Policy Act and the Natural Gas Act] accords it broad ratemaking authority... The Court has
repeatedly held that the just and reasonable standard does not compel the Commission to use
any single pricing formula in general.").
181. As Michael Herz explained, "to the extent Congress has in fact decided something [in
the statute], Chevron's own political theory requires the courts to ensure that agencies act
consistently with that decision." Herz, supra note 27, at 190. Or, as Peter Strauss puts it,
Congress sometimes enacts a statutory term with a "range of indeterminacy" that leaves it to
the agency to develop a concept, provided it does not go off the deep end. Peter L. Strauss, One
HundredFifty Cases PerYear: Some Implications of the Supreme Court'sLimited Resources for
JudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 CoLUM. L REv. 1093, 1121 (1987).
182. Compare, for example, the opinion of the court in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1994), with the dissenting opinion, id. at 245 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
183. Beal v. Poe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977); see also Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 199200 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that state refusal to fund AZT when deemed a medical necessity
was inconsistent with objectives of the Medicaid Act).

1999]

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

as "cost"-based.'8 Put simply, state agencies are particularly wellsuited to filling in statutory interstices and defining ambiguous terms
in cooperative federalism statutes, whereas courts are better at setting forth and applying broader legal principles. 185
An irony of Chevron deference is that it not only admonishes
courts to resist intrusive oversight of highly technical or policy-bound
questions, but it also emphasizes that courts should maintain careful
oversight of articulable legal principles. In this sense, step one of
Chevron-determining whether the statute speaks to the issue at
hand-is not an invitation to courts to throw up their hands in the
face of a complex regulatory scheme, but rather to sort the legal principles from the policy judgments left implicit in the statutory scheme.
Accordingly, the implementation of the Telecom Act not only would be
hampered by an overintrusive judicial review, but would benefit from
the proper type of judicial review-one guided by Chevron. Indeed, as
discussed below, some of those courts refusing to apply the Chevron
two step analysis may actually undertake a less careful scrutiny of the
state agencies' decisions than called for by Chevron, for example, by
classifying certain statutory terms as factual, rather than as legal,
inquiries. 186 If these courts adhered to the Chevron standard, they
would instead articulate the bounds of reasonable choices allowed by
the statute and oversee the application of these choices to ensure that
18
they were faithfully applied to the facts.

184. With respect to the Telecom Act, courts would do well, for example, to pay particular
attention to whether one-time charges associated with the provisioning of network elements
actually reflect real costs (no matter how calculated) and whether state PUCs have allowed
incumbent providers to levy charges on top of the price of purchasing the unbundled elements
necessary to provide service. See, e.g., AT&T Communications Corp. v. Pacific Bell, No. 970080, 1998 WL 246652, at *15-16 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1998) (holding that levying of access
charges in addition to price for unbundled elements violated Telecom Act).
185. As Justice Breyer once noted:
The less important the question of law, the more interstitial its character, the more
closely related to the everyday administration of the statute and to the agency's (rather
than the court's) administrative or substantive expertise, the less likely it is that
Congress. . . "wished" or "expected" the courts to remain indifferent to the agency's
views.
Mayburg v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984).
186. See infra Part V.B.2.
187. The Supreme Court, in its discussion of the state agency role in implementing the
Medicaid Act, hinted at such an approach. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,
519-20 (1990) ("While there may be a range of reasonable rates, there certainly are some rates
outside that range that no State could ever find to be reasonable and adequate under the Act.").
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2. A Telecom Act Without Deference to State Agencies
Should courts decline to accord deference to state agencies
charged with implementing the Telecom Act, they are likely to look
for ways to avoid many of the difficult interpretive questions called for
by de novo review of state agency determinations. Specifically, there
appear to be four readily available (and already used) approaches that
will offer courts a way out of resolving interpretive questions presented by the Telecom Act: (1) relying on FCC rules, even if not
binding, as a source of interpretive guidance; (2) declaring that openended statutory concepts are really fact questions on which they may
permissibly defer to the state agency; (3) reviewing legal issues de
novo, but applying a deferential standard when reviewing the
application of that standard to the facts; or (4) determining that the
open-ended statutory standards themselves allow for a zone of
reasonableness, thereby stating a de novo legal standard, but applying a deferential one in fact. Many of the cases rejecting the state
agencies' argument that they merit Chevron deference in implementing the Telecom Act have taken one of these approaches to avoiding
intrusive judicial review in practice, even while giving lip service to
the value of uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.
The first approach envisions that the federal courts would
interpret the Telecom Act in a manner similar to how some courts
have treated the Medicaid Act-deferring to the state agency when it
acts in accordance with standards set by the federal agency. With
this approach, courts would view non-binding FCC regulations as
providing valuable guidance to courts on the validity of state agency
decisions. Under such an approach, non-binding FCC regulations are
treated as comparable to interpretive rules adopted by agencies
without a statutory charge to do so, such as those issued by the
EEOC. 18 Although no court has specifically relied on this model as its
approach, 189 some courts have looked to the FCC's regulations for
guidance. In U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. TCG Seattle, for
example, Judge Dwyer upheld the Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission's price-setting for unbundled local loops'9
188. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (holding that EEOC
regulations, though not authorized by statute, "'do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.' ") (quoting Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
189. One court did note that such an approach would not work in the Telecom Act context
because the FCC was not granted a formal oversight role, such as that enjoyed by HCFA in the
Medicaid Act context. See GTE S., Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517, 524 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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on the ground that it was based on a similar methodology to that
recommended by the FCC, which, though not binding, "still can be
informative."'191
The second approach, which construes many of the difficult
statutory terms as fact questions, may well become popular among
courts that wish to proclaim federal judicial supremacy, but still wish
to avoid the challenging task of closely analyzing pricing methodologies. With this approach, courts can have it both ways, refusing to
defer to state agencies on legal questions, but avoiding the difficult
work that would ensue should they take on the responsibility of interpreting open-ended statutory standards. In fact, Judge Dwyer recently took this approach (in addition to relying on the FCC's similar
methodology), concluding that a state commission's determinations on
pricing decisions:
Must be treated as fact findings and reviewed to test whether they are arbitrary and capricious. Under that deferential standard, a reviewing court under
the Administrative Procedure Act (analogous here) is to consider whether the

agency's decision was based on consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of192
judgment. The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.

Judge Dwyer's decision on the "cost"-based standard may be an
attempt to resolve the tension between two competing rationales: (1)
not to defer to state agencies on legal questions (which he held was
inappropriate under the Telecom Act); and (2) not to get into the
business of second-guessing and recalculating highly technical policy
decisions.
Given this tension, Judge Dwyer's conclusion is
understandable, but unfortunate in that it may compromise the
"cost"-based pricing standard of its legal force even under a Chevron
standard. 193 That is, by classifying all pricing decisions as fact

190. The "local loop" is the term that refers to the wire from an incumbent's central office to
an end user.
191 U.S. W. Communications, Inc. v. TCG Seattle, No. C97-354WD, slip op. at 5 (W.D.
Wash. filed Jan. 22, 1998); see also MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 7 F.
Supp. 2d 674, 678-80 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (noting that an FCC determination regarding "dark fiber"
in a proceeding predating the Telecom Act "is quite persuasive in considering whether such a

service is a network element under the current Act.").
192. U.S. W. Communications,Inc., No. C97-354WD, slip op. at 4 (citation omitted). Other
courts have viewed the matter as a legal issue and reviewed the question de novo. See GTE S.,

Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517, 529 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting that the Act is best read "as not
allowing historical cost" inputs for developing the prices of unbundled network elements.).
193. In a later case, Judge Dwyer stated that the Act "does not require that a just and reasonable rate' be based on actual or historical costs." MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc.
v. GTE N.W., Inc., No. C97-742WD, slip op. at 7 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 1998). Unfortunately,
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questions, courts may move away from even taking on the level of
oversight called for by the two step Chevron analysis.
In an interesting twist on the fact question approach, it seems
likely that some courts will not classify all legal determinations as
fact issues, but rather will do so on a selective basis to avoid
particularly laborious inquiries. In MCI v. BellSouth, for example,
the court essentially concluded that because the FCC decided to leave
to state commissions the decision of whether a subloop was an
unbundled element, the decision must be regarded as an issue of
fact. 94 If the MCI court appreciated the nature of the Telecom Act's
cooperative federalism scheme, however, it could have recognized that
the FCC's failure to fill a gap or answer a legal question does not
automatically transform the issue into a fact question or force courts
to address the matter de novo. Rather, according Chevron deference
to state agencies acknowledges that they are equipped to address
such unanswered issues. Thus, even without classifying these issues
as fact questions, courts can "defer to the technical expertise" of state
commissions as they interpret and apply federal telecommunications
law.195
A third approach addresses legal issues de novo, but uses a
deferential review when legal standards are applied to facts.
Unfortunately, this approach will run up against some difficult linedrawing problems and may be difficult to institute. First, courts may
find it difficult to apply a strategy that neither finds its roots in traditional agency review (i.e., Chevron) nor in traditional appellate oversight, which requires de novo review to ensure that a legal standard is
faithfully and properly applied to the facts.'9 Second, this new standard, though a creative means of guarding against an overintrusive
judicial review, may immerse the judiciary in determinations of what
constitutes a clean legal judgment as opposed to an application of a
legal principle to particular factual circumstances. It may well be
that courts resolve this tension by defining the Act's legal standards
at a fairly high level of generality and by employing a deferential
review in practice, while insisting that they scrutinize all legal determinations de novo.
probably because the case was not argued on that ground, he did not make clear what, if any,
pricing standards are imposed by the Act.
194. MCI Telecomm., 7 F. Supp. 2d at 680-81.
195. Id. at 681.
196. See U.S. W. Communications, Inc. v. Hix, 986 F. Supp. 13, 19 (D. Colo. 1997) (stating
that this standard "does not rely on technical distinctions between questions of law and
questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact as those terms have been defined by other
cases.").
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Finally, courts may avoid an intrusive judicial review of state
agency decisions through a form of burden shifting that requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the decision is inconsistent with federal
law. This strategy contemplates that courts will interpret statutory
terms to allow for multiple approaches, any of which would be upheld
as being consistent with the Act. To be sure, this is deference by
another name, but Judge Dwyer also utilized this approach in a later
case addressing the issue of whether "dark fiber"197 is an unbundled
network element. He concluded that, "[as] [t]here is no authority
exactly on point... [tihe WUTC's decision on this point cannot be
deemed arbitrary and capricious."' 98 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit,
which has refused to defer to state agencies in the Medicaid Act context, has taken this very approach, explaining that it will review state
reimbursement plans de novo, but only under a standard that requires that they "fall within a 'zone or range of reasonableness.'"199
On this approach, courts would acknowledge that the "cost"-based
pricing standard for network elements imposes a legal standard, but
would avoid the hard work of defining that standard by interpreting it
as a broad one that allows for a number of different approaches.20c
VI. CONCLUSION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 launched a grand experiment in regulatory reform. Even in the best of all possible worlds,
the project of facilitating competition in local telephony through the
sharing of incumbent providers' facilities with new entrants was not
going to be easy; that is, the technical, economic, and legal challenges
inherent in readjusting an almost century old system of regulation
takes time. As federal courts review decisions by the state administrative agencies charged with implementing federal law, they will
increasingly be asking themselves how best to understand their role
197. The term "dark fiber" refers to the unlit fiber optic conduits in the local network.

198. MCLMetro Access Transmission Servs., No. C97-742WD, slip op. at 8. Other courts
have deemed this issue a question of law and interpreted the matter for themselves. See MCI
Telecomm., 7 F. Supp. 2d at 679-80 (reversing the state agency's decision that "dark fiber" did
not constitute a network element).
199. Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. and Rehabilitation Servs., 31 F.3d
1536, 1539 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado, 842 F.2d 1158,
1167 (10th Cir. 1988)).
200. One court has already taken this approach in a challenge to a state's universal service
program. See Citizens' Util. Ratepayer Bd. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 956 P.2d 685, 700 (Kan.
1998) ("We hold the revenue neutral concept is not prohibited by or contrary to the Federal
Act.").
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in this project. In answering this question, they will also be addressing a much larger one: Does Chevron'apply to cooperative federalism
schemes where Congress delegates interpretive authority to state
agencies?
In adopting the Chevron framework, the Supreme Court concluded that the rise of the administrative state warranted a departure
from the Marbury dictum. Similarly, the rise of the cooperative federalism state-exemplified by statutes such as the Telecom
Act-suggests that the Chevron doctrine should also be applied to
judicial review of state agency decisions, even though doing so departs
from Hunter's Lessee's rhetorical call for absolute uniformity in the
interpretation and application of federal law. But moving away from
the Hunter's Lessee mindset and applying Chevron to state agency
decisions will enable federal courts and state agencies to better
maintain their proper institutional roles and to fulfill the promise of
cooperative federalism. Conversely, if the federal courts refuse to give
state agencies the deference that they deserve, they may ultimately
undermine the possibilities presented by the emerging cooperative
federalism state.

